

Application for an allocation from Federal Foreign Office funds

- Division S03 -

for the support of crisis prevention, stabilisation, peace-building and mediation projects implemented by international and non-governmental organisations

Integrated Regional Stabilisation of the Lake Chad Basin (Phase II)

27 November 2018

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**Brief overview of the application**

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| Project title: | **Integrated Regional Stabilisation of the Lake Chad Basin (Phase II)** |
| Applicant organisation: | United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) |
| Legal status/official registration: | International Governmental (UN) Organisation |
| Implementing organisation: | UNDP |
| Planned measures  (what is to be done in concrete terms): | 1. **Objective 1**: Coordination and implementation of the Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin strengthened. 2. **Objective 2**: Community security, local governance, community-based reconciliation and reintegration are strengthened, contributing to enhanced regional stability. |
| Number of direct beneficiaries (**Phase II**): | * Population reached by reconciliation activities: 3,000,000 * Community members directly benefiting from stabilisation activities: 75,000 * Trained CJTF members / Vigilantes for community security services: 2,000 * CJTF / Vigilantes who have received reintegration support: 1,000 * Affected communities benefiting from stabilisation: 25 (in four countries) * Local Governance Administrations benefiting: 10 (in four countries) |
| Number of indirect beneficiaries: | 4,800,000 (estimated, based on existing population figures) |
| Project country and location: | Project Implementation: Nigeria (Borno, Yobe, Adamawa), Niger (Diffa), Cameroon (Far North), Chad (Lac, Kanem, Hadjer-Lamis);  Project Coordination: Support to LCBC and regional processes: Chad (N´Djamena), Operational coordination: Nigeria (Abuja & Maiduguri);  Technical Support: UNDP Regional Service Centre (Addis Ababa). |
| Duration: | Phase I: 1 September 2017 – 31 December 2018 (completed)  **Phase II: 1 January 2019 – 31 March 2020** |
| Amount requested (in €): | **Phase II: Euro 6,264,726.51**  (**2019**: Euro 5,556,547.48; **2020**: Euro 708,179.03) |
| Third party funding (in €): | N/A |
| Own resources (in €): | N/A |
| Is the total expenditure covered | yes  no |
| Is this an application for initial or follow-up funding | Follow-up funding (Phase II) |
| Has the organisation been granted funding by the Federal Foreign Office or another federal ministry for any previous project(s) | yes , by FFO & BMZ no |
| Has the project already started | yes  no  Phase I (Initial Phase) started 1 September 2017 and will end 31 December 2018 |

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- Division S03 -

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| Annual report and statute of the organisation is enclosed  See weblink on page xx  Annual report and statute of partner organisation(s) is enclosed |

**Applicant organisation**

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| --- | --- |
| Name: UNDP, Regional Service Centre for Africa | **Project contact person** |
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| Email: lamin.manneh@undp.org | Extension No.: +251 115170700 |
| Homepage: http://www.ng.undp.org/ | Email: lamin.manneh@undp.org |
| Legal status/official registration: | International (UN) Organisation |
| Person(s) entitled to represent the organisation: Director, Regional Service Center for Africa | |
| Bank account details: [will be communicated separately] | |
| IBAN: [will be communicated separately] | |

**Partner organisation: N/A**

**1. Profile of the applicant organisation and, if applicable, the partner organisation**

1. Description of the Applicant

UNDP has an effective, global management system and a strong corporate record of managing complex programmes in emergencies, crisis and post-conflict settings. It has a well-established system of risk management through its result-based management structures, monitoring and evaluation, and working in partnership with multiple organisations, including governments and non-governments actors.

The UNDP is the global lead of the early recovery cluster and has demonstrated worldwide leadership in supporting early recovery and stabilisation processes in countries emerging from crisis and conflicts. It has recently conducted a review of stabilisation programmes world-wide, which has informed the design of the present programme strategy.

In implementing crisis-response, early-recovery and development programmes, UNDP relies on a network of country offices and representations on the ground in 192 countries. In addition, its team of global and regional advisors based in New York and Addis Ababa (for Africa) respectively, is supporting and guiding country offices in the design and implementation of programmes. UNDP´s Bureau for Policy and Programme Support (BPPS) in New York brings together policy work across all regions and all levels and ensures that risk awareness and crisis prevention and recovery are fully integrated into development work. With an increased focus on country support, a number of experts are based in regional hubs to ensure that policy-related work is directly relevant to country-level results.

The UNDP Regional Service Centre for Africa, based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and with additional offices in Dakar, Senegal and Nairobi, Kenya, serves UNDP’s 45 Country Offices in sub-Saharan Africa, develops high quality knowledge and policy, is the organisation’s main interface with regional and continental bodies such as the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities. With dedicated expertise on PVE, stabilisation and de-radicalisation, the centre has established a regional PVE programme through which it supports and oversees all Africa-based country offices, especially in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin, in the implementation of PVE and de-radicalisation programmes. Dedicated to the Lake Chad Basin, the Regional Service Centre is currently deploying a Senior Advisor in Chad to support civil-military cooperation between the MNJTF and the LCB Commission, as well as the to support Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) activities between the four countries. This Senior Advisor will provide technical support to the present programme.

### *UNDP’s Position on Reintegration / DDR*

UNDP has been a key partner in reintegration / DDR since 1991, supporting national governments and stakeholders in formulating strategies, planning and managing programmes in both mission and non-mission contexts. By 2010, UNDP was supporting reintegration-DDR of ex-combatants with armed forces and groups in 22 countries around the world.[[1]](#footnote-2) Traditionally, the rationale for UNDP’s engagement in reintegration/DDR has been to support peace processes and to contribute to security so that post-conflict recovery and development can begin.

UNDP co-chairs with DPKO the Inter-Agency Working Group (IAWG) on DDR and has played a key role in the development of UN Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), which was launched in 2006, and subsequently led the revision of the IDDRS reintegration module in 2014. Although the UN guidance/IDDRS focuses on DDR in post-conflict contexts, UNDP has also flexibly supported reintegration efforts in conflict-affected contexts over the years. These were notably in Haiti through the joint development of the community violence reduction (CVR)/Community Security (CS) approach with the UN mission, Afghanistan through the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) and the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP), Somalia through Rule of Law/Youth for Change initiatives and Sudan Darfur Community-Based Reintegration and Stabilisation Programme (DCBRP) and non-mission areas through the Community Stabilisation and Security Programme (C2SP).

UNDP’s role in reintegration/DDR has therefore evolved over the years, adapting to changing contexts, political imperatives, institutional reconfigurations and funding availability. To offer guidance and support for reintegration practitioners operating in the more protracted conflicts, where armed groups are linked to criminal networks and associated with violent extremism and radicalisation, UNDP has been leading the IAWG in devising new standards for these contexts and creating an integrated reintegration mechanism.

For concrete lessons learned from UNDP’s DDR programmes, please refer to below section 3.

### *UNDP programme and capacities in Nigeria*

UNDP Country Office has been working with and supporting the Government of Nigeria with its efforts towards national development at all levels since the 1960s. Today, it is managing a total annual programme budget of US$ 70 million.

UNDP initiated its crisis response in Northeast Nigeria in 2014 by launching a number of pilot initiatives for early recovery, stabilisation, livelihoods, conflict prevention and peacebuilding. In close partnership with the Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (MRRR) in Borno, and the National/State Emergency Management Agency (NEMA/SEMA) in Adamawa and Yobe. With financial support from the European Union, the Governments of Japan, Germany, Norway, and Switzerland, USAID as well as Nigeria Humanitarian Fund, these pilot initiatives included:

* Reconstruction of public infrastructure and housing, through a labour-intensive community-led process. Eleven facilities including schools and healthcare infrastructure were reconstructed in Kaga, Mafa, Ngala, Damboa, and Hawul LGAs, all in Borno, while providing opportunities of emergency employment. Interventions benefitted over 38,500 conflict-affected people. In over 20 LGAs in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states, additional 19 schools and boreholes are under construction and other 35 infrastructure projects will start soon.
* Livelihoods diversification and creation of economic opportunities. Empowerment of 1,300 farmers to restart farming activities and 480 entrepreneurs to re-start their businesses in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe.
* Provision of citizenship and vocational training for 580 IDPs, victims of conflict drawn from Adamawa, Borno, Gombe and Yobe. Unconditional cash transfer (UCT) and cash for work to over 80,000 most vulnerable to cater to the immediate needs of the IDPs in Michika, Adamawa State, Askira Uba, Borno State and Fika in Yobe State.
* Enhanced social cohesion and reconciliation. Establishment of four mediation networks in 10 communities (targeting 80 religious leaders). Over one million people have been reached by peace messages through community-focused radio and other sensitisation programmes. Eighty security agents deployed within the region have been trained on protection of civilians, and 92 officials and 200 clerics, community leaders, women and religious leaders were trained on counter-radical narratives.

The above-mentioned pilots since have evolved into a programme for the Northeast, with a US$ 20 million annual budget, consisting of the following initiatives:

* Integrated Regional Stabilisation of the Lake Chad Basin (funded by Germany);
* Integrated Community Stabilisation in Northeast Nigeria supported by:
* Integrated Community Recovery and Resilience in Borno State (funded by the European Union)
* Supporting Community Stabilisation in Northeast Nigeria in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe State (funded by Japan)
* Integrated Community Recovery & Stabilisation of Bara Ward in Gulani LGA of Yobe State (funded by Nigerian Humanitarian Fund/OCHA)
* Supporting Community Stabilisation and Early Recovery in Northeast Nigeria in Yobe and Adamawa State (funded by Canada)
* Supporting Communities for Safer Schools Initiative (funded by USAID)
* Addressing Critical Information and Coordination Gaps for Recovery in Borno (funded by EU/ECHO);
* Preventing and responding to violent extremism in Nigeria (Implemented in all of Nigeria, with a Northeast chapter);
* Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding programme (Implemented in all of Nigeria, with a Northeast chapter); and
* Sustainable Waste Management and Environmental Protection in Borno State (funded by the European Union)

In March 2017, UNDP officially established a sub office in Maiduguri, Borno (the epicentre of the Boko haram crisis) coordinating and managing activities in Borno and the rest of the affected States in the North East. Currently, there is a team of six international and 10 national staff working from the office in Maiduguri and implementing UNDP’s current activities in the Northeast within UNDP Nigeria’s overall programme of support on Governance & Peacebuilding; Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development. With the establishment of this office, UNDP Nigeria has launched an integrated community stabilisation pilot in Ngwom, Mafa LGA and Kimba, Biu LGA. Processes and components described in the present document have been tested in these pilots, with the intention to further develop these into a regional response covering the Lake Chad Basin.

### *UNDP programme and capacities in Cameroon*

In Cameroon since September 1972, UNDP is supporting Cameroon's efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. UNDP Cameroon's program is drawn from the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) covering the period 2013-2017. The country programme´s overall aim to strengthen resilience of the population in coping with environmental, social and economic shocks through improving quality of government services, preserving social cohesion and preventing violent extremism.

UNDP has an early recovery, stabilisation and prevention of violent extremism project team in Maroua covering the Lake Chad Basin and other affected zones in the Far North. The project team is composed of a senior project manager, two national experts, an M&E specialist, an administration and financial specialist and two drivers in Maroua and Kousseri supported by an early recovery advisor and a resource mobilisation and communication specialist in Yaoundé. Three project cars, including an armoured vehicle, are available in Maroua and Kousseri. UNDP is leading the Early Recovery cluster and the project team works as a secretariat of the cluster in Maroua and Yaoundé.

In early 2018, UN agencies established a UN house in Kousseri town (15 km from N’djamena and 60 km Nigerian border-Borno State) to respond efficiently to the challenges in the Lake Chad Basin. Since July 2018, UNDP has deployed an early recovery expert in Kousseri to closely supervise the implementation of three projects in stabilisation and preventing violent extremism (The current project and PBSO and Japanese funded projects). The team is expecting a national UNV and an international UNV to join before the year end.

Two early recovery projects were implemented in 2015 and 2016 in Mayo-Tsanaga, Mayo-Sava and Logone et Chari divisions. UNDP interventions on early recovery focused on local cattle markets construction to revamp local economy, support to youth and women access to temporary employments and supporting social cohesion to prevent tension between displaced and host communities. During the implementing period, the project team faced difficulty to deploy due to security reason. However, UNDP has developed a partnership with division and district delegates to pursue the activities in the field through a training session on planning and monitoring for delegates who monitored the activities. The measure of monitoring the activities by local authorities was taken to overcome the security challenge. Three projects with funding from the UN Trust Fund for Human Security Trust Fund and Japan have been implemented in Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga, Logone et Chari, Mayo-Kani and Mayo-Danay divisions in the Far North region. A cross-border project with Chad on peacebuilding and prevention of violent extremism funded by PBSO has also been implemented in Logone et Chari division. Based on these experiences, Cameroon CO with the support of the Regional Service Centre for Africa has developed a programme of Stabilisation and Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) 2018-2020 and this programme is composed of six outcomes, 1) Rule of Law and Security, 2) DDR, 3) Livelihood initiatives, 4) PVE, 5) Community resilience and 6) Research and Coordination. Three projects implemented from 2018 (two projects funded by Japan and the initial phase of this project funded by Germany) are a part of this programme and to maximise impacts and to avoid duplication, future projects including this project have been/will be formulated based on the programme according to donors’ interest.

Through its recognized convening power, UNDP implements the projects in partnership with several institutions, including governmental entities (the Ministry of Economy, Planning and Regional Development (MINEPAT), the Ministry of Territorial Administration (MINAT), the Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and Animal Industries (MINEPIA), the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MINADER), the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Civic Education (MINJEC)), local authorities (municipalities, sous-préfet, prefect), religious and traditional leaders, University of Maroua, civil society, and in close collaboration with other UN agencies in their respective mandate (FAO, UNFPA, UNHCR and UNICEF). UNDP is working in partnership with four local and international NGOs, a Platform for social cohesion composed of notabilities, decision makers at local levels, civil society and youths and finally with an inter faith organisation.

### *UNDP programme and capacities in Chad*

Cooperation between the UNDP and the Government of the Republic of Chad is governed by the Basic Agreement signed between the two parties on 14 October 1977. The UNDP Country Office in Chad has both an operational office and programmatic interventions in the Lake Chad basin region, through a field office located in Bol, which is currently implementing projects aiming at improving the livelihoods and at achieving the structural transformation of productive capacities that are sustainable and employment-intensive for the communities, especially women, youth, refugees, IDPs and other marginalized groups, that were impacted by the crisis.

The following relevant initiatives are currently carried out and will be leveraged for the implementation of the project:

* Through its project onprevention of violent extremism, UNDP Chad supports affected and displaced people i*n Bol and Baga Sola localities, including small islands alongside the lake,* by promoting stabilisation through the restoration of livelihoods for affected and displaced people. UNDP is also supporting the development of skills and capacities, in order to stabilise the community and restore people’s dignity and self-worth by helping them to support themselves and their families and to regain control of their lives. To address the root causes of radicalisation, support for livelihood opportunities is complemented by efforts to address behavioural/attitudinal changes of youth at school and at home. Further, in the framework of the project, UNDP is supporting religious institutions and civil society to effectively participate in community resilience to conflict, radicalisation and violent extremism through effective communication for peaceful cohabitation and developing counter-narrative to violent extremism and radicalisation. Finally, the UNDP is supporting the development of a national strategy on the prevention of Violent Extremism in Chad that, once adopted, will serve as a programming framework for counter terrorism and prevention of violent extremism
* Furthermore, UNDP is supporting conflict mitigation and reintegration of refugees and returnees in the Southern part of the country, targeting the IDPs, returnees and refugees, with internal and Japan funding. UNDP is promoting social stability by creating space for civil society to be more engaged and responsive in order to address intercommunity latent conflicts between the host communities, the IDPs, the Returnees and the Refugees communities. UNDP is also implementing recovery and community driven resilience activities for the most vulnerable refugees, IDPs and host families.
* Through an extension of the **Human Security Project**, UNDP is aiming at providing livelihoods means to women’s associations in the Sila region by providing Multifunctional platform for their economic activities and easing their daily workloads. UNDP is also promoting small gardening by providing water wells so that food security is combined with economic opportunities for host communities and displaced population.
* Through the Sahel 3 and 4 Border Management project respectively, UNDP is addressing the legal and institutional framework against terrorism by ensuring that this is effective and consistent with the fundamental principles of human rights. Communities, particularly the youth and the women, are expected to be able to reduce their socio-economic vulnerability and increase their ability to prevent violent extremism and radicalisation. The Sahel project is also developing a Lake Chad Strategy and building the capacity of the Border management institutions. UNDP is also addressing security issues to facilitate cross-border informal trade in the region of Lake Chad.
* A new project funded by France is aiming at the restoration of fragile ecosystems around Lake Chad basin through reforestation, and the GEF is about to approve a Lake Chad basin climate risk project, under the National Adaptation Plan (NAP).

The UNDP Country office has, in the course of the implementation of these projects, secured valuable relationships with local government, international NGOs involved in resilience activities as well as local NGOs and community-based organisations. Further, strong partnership and relationship have been developed with traditional, religious and community leaders as well as youth and women leaders in the region, especially in Bol and Baga Sola, the two main towns of the region.

UNDP has established a field office in Bol to coordinate and monitor the different initiatives implemented in the Lake Chad Basin region. The office is currently collocated within WFP premises and prefab units have been ordered to increase the available space. The office in Bol includes the following capacities: two seasoned project coordinators (one international and one national), one international M&E and communication officer, two administrative-finance programme associates and two drivers.

### *UNDP programme and capacities in Niger*

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has been present in Niger since 1977. The basic agreement governing cooperation between UNDP and the Republic of Niger was signed on 2 May 1977 by the Government.

UNDP Niger has a strong experience in de-radicalisation and community resilience (Stabilisation) in the Lake Chad Basin especially through a contribution to address the root causes of migration and displacement and building resilience of affected communities in the region of Diffa. The following ongoing initiatives are worth mentioning in the context of stabilisation programming:

* *Supporting the resilience of communities and households*, particularly women headed households, through diversified livelihood activities along Lake Chad: Emergency labour intensive public works, job creation opportunities and income generation activities, especially for the youth to reduce incentives for youth radicalisation and by addressing the feeling of abandonment, marginalisation and exclusion resulting from the lack of livelihood opportunities and of access to basic social services;
* *Increasing the access of vulnerable communities, in particular women and girls, to basic socioeconomic services* through the rehabilitation and/or construction of socioeconomic infrastructure such as health centres, elementary schools, feeder roads and community market places;
* *Strengthening regional and community-based peace and security early warning mechanisms* to prevent and mitigate the negative impact of current insecurity as well as supporting inter/intra community social cohesion and dialogue for peaceful coexistence with particular attention to women and youth engagement. This project will strengthen existing community structures and/or establish new ones where they don’t exist. More specifically, this project will build their capacity and support them to coordinate and work in synergy with other peace and security architecture on the ground. This component also includes strengthening the organisational and institutional capacity of local and decentralized authorities and institutions, including traditional and religious leaders, youth and women’s organisations in the area of peace-building, conflict prevention, community security and crisis management. Existing peace committees facilitate the transmission of information from the grassroot to the communal level. The community police, to be put in place in the second phase of this project will have as first interlocutors the peace committees. The coordination of actions between the two will enable the development of communal security plans which will serve as framework to react quickly and efficiently to the prevention and response of community conflicts.

Since 2017, technical assistance and monitoring has been handled by Country Office staff. The process of hiring a dedicated team for Phase II will be completed at the end of December 2018.

In order to carry out the activities, UNDP relies heavily on the de-concentrated services of the State, territorial institutions and civil society organisations. UNDP has partnership arrangements with the following institutions for the implementation of its projects, which could be leveraged for the project:

* Governmental institutions: Diffa Governorate, Regional Council, Regional and departmental divisions of rural engineering, environment, water and sanitation, the High Authority for Peace Building, 12 municipal authorities;
* National and local NGOs: VND Nour, AJEDEV, DEMI-E, WANEP; and
* Cooperation with other agencies: OCHA, UNHCR and UNICEF (rehabilitation and construction of health centres and schools)

1. Financial Management and Accounting Systems

UNDP’s project implementation, including the management and accounting for financial transactions, is based on United Nations Financial Rules and Regulations as well as the UNDP Programme and Operations Policies and Procedures (<https://popp.undp.org>). As part of these policies and procedures, UNDP’s management and ERP systems are fully compliant with the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS). [[2]](#footnote-3)

The UNDP Enterprise Resources Planning and Accounting system, ATLAS, has been introduced in 2006, and allows for reliable real-time project implementation monitoring and reporting.

In addition, UNDP’s accountability and risk management framework introduced in 2008 underscores the commitment of UNDP to results and risk-based performance management, as well as the shared values and culture of accountability and transparency. The oversight policy of UNDP includes the organisation of independent internal and external oversight to provide assurances to the Executive Board and the Administrator that functional systems of internal controls are in place, including evaluation of the policy framework, efficient utilisation of resources, and adherence to professional and ethical standards in UNDP.[[3]](#footnote-4)


With these systems in place, country offices are subject to continuous and rigid quality tests and oversight in terms of management, invoicing and reporting of expenditures. Overall, UNDP is also subject to regular oversight from the United Nations Board of Auditors.

**2. Project situation**

1. Current Situation

Challenges and drivers of conflict

The Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria and neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Chad and Niger has left over 2.4 million people displaced by 2017 with 1.7 million being internally displaced in Nigeria, and 213,000 Nigerians as refugees[[4]](#footnote-5). The conflict has also resulted in massive destruction of basic infrastructure, health and educational facilities, commercial buildings, private houses and agricultural assets.

 While affected by the same crisis, the situation differs from country to country in the Lake Chad Basin. The below table 1, which is partially based on hard data and partially on estimations from the field level, provides a detailed overview.

Map 1: Attacks and Displacement in the Lake Chad Basin

In the Northeast of Nigeria alone, the epicentre of the insurgency, the total damage is estimated at USD 8.93 billion with the bulk of the losses (79%) attributed to agriculture (USD 3.7 billion) and private housing (USD 3.32 billion). Damage to private enterprises is also significant at USD 0.9 billion or 10 percent of total damages.

OCHA statistics reveal that in 2018, 17.2 million civilians are affected by the conflict and suffer from instable livelihoods.

Northeast Nigeria also hosts the bulk of active Boko Haram fighters, and of vigilantes, estimated at 15,600 to 20,000. As a result of the armed conflict and ongoing Boko Haram attacks, local governance structures are dysfunctional and civil servants displaced in most Local Governance Areas of Borno. Access to Justice and community security are similarly compromised, and lowest compared to the 3 other LCB countries.

In Chad, since 2014, local authorities and communities face a massive influx of IDPs and refugees with displaced people doubling the local population in the district of Baga Sola and Bol localities. With 1o8,400 displaced populations, the areas continue to suffer from insecurity as well as intercommunity tensions and pressure over scarce resources in an already extremely poor region, which lacks basic services and infra-structure. Against this background access for humanitarian and development actors is less impeded than in the three other LCB countries. Boko Haram related violence and attacks are sporadic and of low intensity. Local governance structures are mostly in place and function, and access to justice only partially affected by the crisis. In addition, the closing of borders with neighbouring countries has significantly hampered the cross-border trade, thus eroding the already reduced means of livelihoods.

Table 1: Situation overview in the four countries

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Country[[5]](#footnote-6) | NE Nigeria | Chad | Cameroon | Niger |
| 1 | Affected population | 12,000,000 | 518,000 | 4,000,000 | 704,000 |
| 2 | No. of Refugees | 200,000  (returning refugees) | 93,000 | 363,710  (100,504 from Nigeria) | 115,218 |
| 3 | No. of IDPs | 1,718,700 | 108,400 | 227,581 | 53,884 |
| 4 | Estimated No. of Vigilantes | 15,600 | 1,300 | 5,200 | - |
| 5 | Estimated No. of people associated with BH | 7,000 | 1500 | 4000 | 1,500 |
| 6 | Level of destruction in target areas | High | Low | Medium | Medium |
| 7 | Severely food insecure people | 7,800,000 | 500,000 | 419,000 | 2,100,000 |
| 8 | Local Governance Structures in target areas | Displaced and dysfunctional | Partially affected, but functional | Affected, partially functional | Affected, partially functional |
| 9 | Access to Justice in target areas | Very limited | Partial | Limited | Limited |
| 10 | Community Security in target areas | Very low | Moderate | Low | Low |
| 11 | Level of violence in target areas | Very high  (regular attacks, high density) | Medium - low  (sporadic attacks, low density) | High - medium  (frequent attacks, medium density) | Medium  (sporadic attacks, medium density) |
| 12 | Humanitarian access | Adamawa: Accessible; Yobe: Accessible to Restricted access;  Borno: Restricted to No access | Satisfactory | Limited in isolated areas | Limited in isolated areas |

In Cameroon, the high concentration of IDPs, refugees and returnees in the Far North region - the poorest in the country - puts pressure on economic activities and social cohesion and jeopardizes peace and resilience within communities. Out of a total of 4 million crisis-affected people, 227,581 are internally displaced and 100,504 Nigerian refugees. Border communities in the Lake Chad Basin are significantly affected by the crisis, putting a strain on local economies, including production, trading, and jobs. With the closure of borders, productive youth depending on cross-border trading are particularly affected.

The level of violence in Cameroon is the second highest of the four LCB countries, local governance structures are partially dysfunctional due to violent attacks and community security low in the target areas. The crisis has increased pressure on the pacific coexistence of ethnic, religious and professional groups. In fact, different ethnics such as Arabs, Kotoko, Kanouri, Mousgoum living in peace for decades, have been confronted with inter-ethnic battles for natural resources. The presence of IDPs, refugees out of camp and in camp put a great pressure on the natural resources and fuelled tensions between communities.

In Niger’s Diffa region, security measures undertaken by the government in response to the Boko Haram insurgency resulted in the relocation of more than 200,000 people, which have been cut off from their primary livelihoods. In 2018, the number of IDPs stands at 53,884, while the number of refugees stands at 115,218. Access to socioeconomic services such as education, health, clean and potable water, as well as local and trans-border markets has been seriously impacted. Community security, social cohesion and resilience, as well as human rights are undermined, which hinders peace, security and the development of the region.

**Enhancing regional cooperation**

Recognizing the need for stronger security-sector and military cooperation in the region, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) was established in 1994. In 2012 and further 2015, the MNJTF mandate was expanded and strengthened to encompass counter-terrorism activities.[[6]](#footnote-7) The MNJTF has managed to strengthen joint military action in the basin but is not equipped to support comprehensive socio-economic stabilisation measures. Also, good practice indicates that immediately after military-led clearing and holding of territory, stabilisation measures should be led by civilian institutions. Despite the significant progress made by the MNJTF, it is agreed by all stakeholders that overall success of the collective effort will be contingent upon coherent acceleration and completion of the second phase of the mandate namely to “facilitate the implementation of overall stabilization programmes by the LCBC Member States and Benin in the affected areas, including the full restoration of state authority and the return of IDPs and refugees”. To achieve this, the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) was tasked by its Member States to facilitate the mechanisms and processes required to consolidate the gains of the MNJTF and create conditions necessary for sustainable peace and development in the LCB region.

In order to ensure humanitarian operations will be complemented with comprehensive regional stabilisation efforts, the organizers of the recent Oslo Humanitarian Conference on Nigeria and the Lake Chad region have in February 2017 established a consultative group in support of stabilisation efforts in the Lake Chad Basin, aiming at deepening cooperation and mutual consultation on preventive action and stabilisation measures in the Lake Chad Basin.

42 In March 2017, the United Nations Security Council visited the Lake Chad Basin countries with the aim of receiving a first-hand understanding of the challenges on the ground. The visit resulted in the UN Security Council Resolution 2349, providing an international framework for addressing the crisis and begin building sustainable peace and development for the region.

43 Complementing this resolution have been various conferences and high-level events, such as Berlin (September 2017), N’Djamena (November 2017), Abuja (February and August 2018), Maiduguri (May 2018) and recently, Berlin (September 2018).

44 Notwithstanding the essential roles that national and local governments are playing, the conclusion continues to be that as a regional crisis, the Lake Chad Basin crisis demands a holistic and regionally coordinated response. At the High-Level Conference on the Lake Chad Region in Berlin, co-hosts also recognized that actors in the humanitarian, stabilisation and development spheres have distinct but complementary roles to play to address needs and strengthen the resilience of affected populations[[7]](#footnote-8).

This recognition has resulted in the **Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin** led by Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), which guides this Phase II document. This Strategy was the product of broad consultations among experts of the Lake Chad Basin Commission and those of the African Union Commission, relevant agencies of the United Nations and other stakeholders. Anchored on nine pillars, including regional political integration and cooperation, the Strategy seeks to establish a common approach and an inclusive framework for all stakeholders to support a timely, coordinated, and effective transition from stabilization to early recovery and the resumption of stalled development processes in the Region.

Lastly, in order to enhance regional cooperation, Phase II aims at (i) contributing to improved cooperation, coherence and complementarity among the LCB Member States; (ii) supporting National Governments to develop harmonized national coordination mechanisms and systems, including the Governors’ Forum and the regional Inter-Parliamentary Committee for an effective implementation of the strategy in the Lake Chad Region; and (iii) increasing and improving intra and inter regional cooperation between ECCAS, ECOWAS and CEMAC for Peace Security and Development in the LCB region as well as capacitated the LCBC Secretariat and the AUC for the effective implementation of the strategy.

**De-radicalisation and Reconciliation pending**

The current conflict has exacerbated the pre-existing issues of poverty, exclusion, weak governance, which are key drivers of the conflict. Following 2014, conflict and displacement have eroded, and in some cases ruptured, the bonds and relationships between and within groups and communities. Intra-communal structures and processes that traditionally regulated violence and resolved conflicts have been weakened.

As a consequence, vulnerable groups in the Lake Chad Basis, especially youth, have been much more receptive to messages of radicalisation and ideology combined with the promise of a purpose and socio-economic empowerment. Prevention of violent extremism and peace-building efforts will only be successful if built on a coherent regional approach and on a credible vision for the future of the basin, and if they are accompanied by opportunities especially for youth and the productive part of the population to rebuild their lives. Such an approach is equally required in the 4 Lake Chad Basin countries, especially in those areas most affected by Boko Haram attacks and the ensuing socio-economic insecurity. However, the population, especially vulnerable groups including women, female-headed households, in Northeast Nigeria and North Cameroon are facing the most serious degradation of livelihoods and food security, and the number of youth at risk of radicalisation is highest in these two countries.

A large part of the population, especially women and children, in the Lake Chad Basis has experienced violence, including sexual and gender-based violence, and multiple human rights violations during the past 5 years. Levels of violence, as measured in frequency and density, is highest in Nigeria, followed by Cameroon, Niger and Chad. There are, however, signs of social fragmentation in affected areas of all four countries as tensions based on ethno-religious, social and other divisions including among internally displaced people (IDPs), refugees and host communities are emerging. There is therefore an overarching need for a basin-wide reconciliation and dialogue process that recognizes and deals with the atrocities of the past and initiates a basin-wide process of healing.

**Community security, vigilantes and the need for reconciliation and reintegration**

Despite the efforts of the military, community security in the Lake Chad Basin has been, and continues to be one of the main challenges in the region since local security structures including community-level policing were partially affected (in Chad), strongly affected in Cameroon and Niger and to a large extend destroyed in Nigeria. In response, community and area-based vigilante groups in various shapes and forms organically grew over the past 5 years to provide a minimum of security to the population. Today, there is an estimated number of 26,000 vigilantes across the basin, most of which operate in Northeast Nigeria and belong to the semi-formalised Civilian Joint Task Forces (CJTFs).

The vigilantes in the Lake Chad Basin have filled an important gap in the provision of community security and continue to cooperate with the Military and the local administration. Those vigilante members who will continue to provide security services to their communities urgently require more formal training and accountability processes to avoid human rights abuses, as well as a linkage to the formal early warning and security system of their region. Other members, whose service is not required anymore, need to receive rehabilitation support to leave behind an established culture of violence and reintegrate into the civilian life of their communities by building an alternative livelihood.

The improvement of community-level security services alone, however, will not have the required overall impact. A credible alternative pathway into a different, civilian life also needs to be provided for Boko Haram defectors and surrendering fighters and other associated persons, to sustainably tackle the Boko Haram phenomenon. Based on international best practices and experiences (among them: Afghanistan, Haiti, Somalia and Sudan), a longer-term comprehensive programme of screening, psycho-social support, opportunities for immediate income generation (OIIG), dialogue and reconciliation, as well as subsequent reintegration for surrendering fighters is needed.

Successful state and community-level reconciliation is a prerequisite for any form of reintegration. The experience, among others in Rwanda, Uganda, Mozambique and Sierra Leone shows that cleansing rituals, religious and traditional ceremonies are effective in building trust, promoting reconciliation and forgiveness. The community-level reconciliation needs to complement Federal-led prosecution of the senior leadership and grave human rights violators.

Experience has shown that differences can be reconciled and a gradual increase in trust between parties can be achieved by allowing community structures, religious practices, local customs and values to guide the reconciliation process. Therefore, the inclusive community-based reconciliation and reintegration committees needs to decide on the type of reconciliation approach, activities and timelines, provided the chosen approaches adhere to international human rights law. Approaches may vary in the different areas of the four countries.

Temporary self-exile, oath taking (restrictive or adjudicative, in extreme cases: swear on the Holy Qur’an), dialogue, truth-telling, a public acknowledgement of guilt, denouncing one’s crime and asking forgiveness are among the possible approaches.

Reconciliation activities must start immediately at the community level, including camp or host community settings where communities have not been able to return to their village or place of origin due to security and movement restrictions.

Lessons from UNDP-supported programmes (see Table 2 below) show that reintegration initiatives need to be anchored in broader stabilisation and reconciliation efforts. UNDP acknowledges the primary role of national actors in such reconciliation and reintegration efforts and has often played the role of a convener and supporter of the process, coordinating efforts under the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) and supporting national actors and counterparts in integrated assessments and strategy development.

Experience also shows that achieving sustainable reintegration remains the most crucial and challenging aspect of the disengagement process. This requires supporting reintegration at multiple levels - the individual, family, community, national and regional, and paying attention to its multi-faceted dimensions – economic, social psychosocial and political. It also requires equal support to former fighters and the receiving communities (dual targeting approach). Programmes need to be time-bound, well-resourced and consider context-specific factors and gender dimensions. Finally, in contexts without peace agreements not formally agreed transitional justice mechanisms, attention to the legal framework that will underpin reintegration efforts as well as careful risk analysis and mitigation measures are fundamental.

The currently ongoing “Operation Safe Corridor” in Nigeria has been a first attempt in this direction, but is not yet sufficiently capacitated and not yet based on an appropriate legal framework and international standards.[[8]](#footnote-9) Initial discussions between government authorities and development partners including members of the consultative group and UNDP, IOM, UNODC and UNICEF are taking place, and it will be important to pursue these and shape a solid common approach based on international standards.

Following the N´Djamena Conference in June 2018, the State Governments in Borno and Adamawa in Nigeria requested, and UNDP provided support for the development of a policy and strategy for the reconciliation and reintegration of former Boko Haram associates. In this context, the Borno State Consultative Workshop on Dialogue, Reconciliation and Reintegration was successfully held on 16-18 June 2018 to provide a dialogue platform for key stakeholders to interchange views, opinions and proposals on the specific issues on reconciliation and reintegration policy and process in Borno State.

Table 2: Lessons on Reintegration of Former Fighters from UNDP programmes

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Afghanistan** | **Haiti** | **Somalia** | **Sudan** |
| Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) and Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) | Community Violence Reduction (CVR) with the UN mission Community Security | Rule of Law/Youth for Change (Y4C) with ILO, UNICEF | Darfur Community-Based Reintegration and Stabilisation Programme (DCBRSP) |
| APRP built on DIAG and focused on the Taleban, encouraging members to renounce violence and terrorism, to live within the laws of Afghanistan and join a constructive process of reintegration and peace. Encompassed elements of mediation, reconciliation and community-based approaches. | The programme emerged from the acknowledgement that the context did not require DDR but a community violence reduction approach bringing together gun control, anti-organized crime initiatives, catch up education and  training, access to social services and justice, family engagement and community reconciliation. | The programme targeted youth-at-risk involved in violence, including with Al-Shabaab and in piracy. It contributed to rehabilitation through non-formal education, tools and trainings on social skills, rule of law and civic education.  By the end of 2013, over 2,075 youth, including 329 women benefitted from social rehabilitation and integration. | Following the reintegration of over 30,000 ex-combatants under the CPA, of which 17% were women, the Darfur programme now supports the reintegration of ex-combatants, including women and those with disabilities in Darfur through livelihoods and psychosocial support and community-based quick-impact projects. |
| **LESSONS** show that reintegration of ex-combatants does not need to take place solely in the context of a peace agreement and a formal DDR process, though security, reputational and other risks need to be carefully considered.  Reintegration should not be a standalone programme. It requires solid anchoring in a broader stabilisation initiative, and linkages with peace-making, economic recovery, and justice mechanisms.  Strong communication and public information are key to success. | **LESSONS** highlight that integration is currently best achieved through coordinated programming rather than structural integration.  DDR implementation presupposes certain criteria in place such as the existence of a peace agreement and political commitment to end the violence that did not exist.  CVR and CS are better suited to deal with fragmented, youth criminal groups found in the country using a community-based approach. | **LESSONS** demonstrate the importance of combining approaches such as restorative justice and reintegration:  - Outreach, mediation and identification;  - Rehabilitation and personal development (psychosocial and family/community reconciliation);  - Community service, through labor intensive projects as reparation;  - skills development (, literacy and numeracy)  - Mentorship and case management are key, provided in a gender responsive manner. | **LESSONS** point to further action needed to stimulate rural economies and the importance of including natural resource management in interventions.  Challenges to assist those with disability can be overcome by pooling resources and capacities among civil society organisations and local NGOs.  Preparatory assessments for the participation of women associated with armed groups, leading to understanding their vulnerabilities and capacities are fundamental. |

In Niger, an experimental de-radicalisation and amnesty programme has started and generated initial lessons.[[9]](#footnote-10) A cantonment centre for ex-combatants, whose legal status is yet to be defined, has been created in Diffa. They currently participate in a de-radicalisation program and will receive vocational trainings once the training centres have been constructed and equipped. The court hearings of Boko Haram detainees started this year and are expected to continue in Phase II of the project.

The Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior of Niger have been working closely to give legal status to ex-BH combatants detained in Goudemaria to develop a legal framework and approach for rehabilitation, de-radicalisation and reintegration of former BH fighters and associates. To date, more than 200 ex BH-fighters in Goudoumaria detention camp have received vocational training and additional training facilities will be constructed. Furthermore, within the framework of the preparation of the screening of the ex-combatants of Boko Haram who are detained in prisons all over Niger, 19 magistrates of the anti-terrorist judicial unit were trained on the management of terrorism files.

In Chad, since March 2017, surrendering and detained fighters are being judged and vetted by the Pôle Judiciaire antiterroriste and the Chambre de jugement de la Cour d’Appel (in Niamey). While clear process criteria are also still under development, so far 300 of the detained have been declared not guilty, released, and require urgent reintegration support.

Cameroon conducted a survey of former BH associates in eight councils that identified more than 2000 former Boko Haram associates of whom 1500 are currently camp-based, with the remainder in host communities, in prison or in a military camp. In the absence of a clear policy on the government’s end, local authorities usually choose the option of case by case solution without any coherence. In September 2018, UNDP conducted an additional survey targeting 584 former Boko Haram associates. They reported conflict in relation to access to arable land, farm reclamation, and water sources, at times in the context of heightened ethnic tension. Unprepared community members are hesitant to welcome former associates, perceive them as aggressive, suspect they participated in previous attacks and raids or continue to be Boko Haram informers. Community members fear further Boko Haram attacks as do former associates (in that they will fall victim to revenge attacks from either Boko Haram or disgruntled community members). In spite of this, all former associates agree that their living conditions have improved since they left Boko Haram.

The major issues that need addressing to ensure their reintegration include i) protection by reacquisition or issuance of official documents (birth certificates and national identity cards); ii) health care (especially for people with disabilities during the crisis) and psychosocial care (especially for those who have been raped or sex slaves, or who cannot remarry if they do not know if their lost husband is dead or alive) iii) socio-economic integration and transitional justice after the screening process.

It will be critical to base country-level approaches to demobilisation, de-radicalisation and reintegration on common standards in the four countries of the Lake Chad Basin. These standards should be aligned to relevant international standards, especially the United Nations Integrated DDR Standards and relevant Human Rights standards, as well as to the specific needs in the Lake Chad Basin. Overall, it needs to be ensured that differences in approaches do not lead to incentives for displacement from one country to the other in order to benefit from better conditions and support. The present project is proposing to achieve just this, in close collaboration with all relevant partners.

**Insufficient confidence in public administration and local governance**

Local governance and public administration structures have been heavily affected by the crisis. While local administrations are by-and-large still in place albeit weakened in Cameroon, Niger and Chad, as well as in Yobe and Adamawa in Nigeria, they are dysfunctional in Borno (Nigeria). Physical and administrative structures were destroyed, most civil servants displaced, and basic service provision halted. At the same time, grievances of the past related to underdevelopment and insufficient resources provision to communities were one of the drivers of the Boko Haram movement and are still to be addressed.

The confidence and trust of the population on formal state structures is therefore limited. Traditional leadership structures (for instance in Borno / Nigeria: Shehu, District heads, Lawans, Bulamas) enjoy at this stage more confidence and are also more functional, despite consistent efforts by Boko Haram to undermine their role. The rebuilding of effective state structures at the local level, a key prerequisite of stabilisation, needs to be linked to the process of dialogue, mediation and reconciliation between communities, traditional leadership structures and public administration officials. Beyond this dialogue, the public administration will need to demonstrate its ability to deliver a minimum of basic services to communities if it is to regain the confidence of the population.

In all 4 Basin countries, the insufficient presence of state authorities in Lake Chad areas, especially in Chad in the island areas, is considered as one driving factors which facilitated the expansion of Boko Haram activities. The restoration of state authorities and security forces can play a decisive role in the stabilisation process in the region. Promoting an effective border management and encouraging a permanent dialogue between security and defence forces and the civil population will, in great deal, facilitate the restoration of the confidence in the public administration and local governance as well in defence and security forces.

**Vulnerable groups, especially women and youth, need protection**

With regards to gender equality, it has been recognized that the Lake Chad Basin has historically had a poor record of women’s empowerment including low school enrolment, preponderance of early marriages for girls and poor participation of women in public life. The region’s deeply-rooted patriarchal norms, often codified in law and reinforced by socio-cultural institutions, have defined women’s status through marriage and childbearing and confined them to gender roles that do not go beyond the domestic sphere. The conflict has further exacerbated these discriminatory practices and increased insecurity for women and girls who are directly targeted by Boko Haram.

For instance, in April 2014, Boko Haram attacked a Girls’ Boarding Secondary School in Chibok LGA in Southern Borno State / Nigeria and abducted over 200 schoolgirls in one single attack. Over 2000 young women and boys, mostly unmarried, have been among the victims of the dastardly attacks of Boko Haram between 2009 and 2015 ranging from the slaughter of about 40 School boys in Buni Yadi, Yobe State / Nigeria to incessant attacks on small communities from where they usually cart away young women and girls, many of whom are forced to marry members of the violent insurgent group. Vulnerable women and girls are compelled to live in undignified conditions in overcrowded IDP sites with weak protection and security measures in place.

Harassments of women and girls has been reported in both IDP Camps and host communities in the Lake Chad Basin, often in the course of conducting daily domestic chores such as fetching water or firewood or whilst using latrines and showers. With rampant hunger and malnutrition, displaced women are often forced to resort to negative coping mechanisms including survival/transactional sex, often to support the livelihood of their families.

Against this background, approaches to stabilisation in the region will need to ensure that all vulnerable groups, especially women and girls, receive dedicated support and protection and that the effectiveness of such support is regularly monitored, and programme strategies adjusted as required.

*Achievements Phase I*

Phase I activities in the four countries closely aligned with the Phase I project document. Phase I results, challenges and opportunities are documented in the annual and 6-months progress reports[[10]](#footnote-11) and a small selection is summarised in the remainder of this section with the aim to set the stage for the Phase II strategy and activities.

**Community consultations.** Phase I, in 2017 and the first half of 2018, saw an intensive process of consultations to understand needs; gather opinions and perceptions; and consolidate stakeholder views and recommendations in areas relevant to the Phase I project document, such as community-security; prevention of violent extremism and de-radicalisation; local governance; and reconciliation and reintegration. The consultations were conducted to ensure needs-based interventions and to ensure the voice of the communities was present in key events. To name one example, in preparation for the Regional Governors´ Forum, UNDP Country Offices organised over 100 focus group discussions in 25 communities in Cameroon (5), Chad (6), Niger (4) and Nigeria (10) in March and April 2018 involving more than 1,100 participants. The communities were selected based on a high number of conflict-affected persons living in or around these areas, including high populations of IDPs. At the community level, UNDP leveraged its existing networks (having in many cases previously set up similar consultations structures) to enable a breakdown into four different sub-groups (aside from Cameroon where a fifth group of village chiefs, religious leaders was also held): men, women, young men and young women. In addition to the community-level consultations, key stakeholders were engaged in Diffa, Niger and in Maiduguri, Nigeria. These consultations contributed by adding additional perspectives from different key interest groups, such as civil society organisations, traditional rulers and religious leaders, women’s groups, among others. In all consultations, participants discussed a catalogue of questions around the rule of law, local governance and basic service provision; livelihoods; radicalisation; security; reintegration; and reconciliation.

**Governors´ Forum**. The Forum emerged from the recommendations of the Senior Officials’ Meeting of the Oslo Consultative Group on Prevention and Stabilisation in the Lake Chad Region, held in Berlin in September 2017. It aims to support the political process to stabilize the region, prevent further crises in the region, and makes a significant contribution to the regional response to the challenges, as called for in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2349 (2017). At the inaugural meeting in Maiduguri on 8-9 May 2018, fully funded by the German Government under Phase I, nine governors from Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria convened with over 150 stakeholders representing national institutions, multilateral and bilateral partners, as well as civil society from the region. The two-day event included thematic sessions on regional stabilisation, reintegration and reconciliation and transitional justice, as well as broader discussions with partners of the region and governors’ perspectives on stabilisation, peacebuilding and sustainable development. Governors agreed they would use the Forum as a mechanism to advance the stabilisation, peace and sustainable development agenda in the Lake Chad Basin, including as it relates to the development and implementation of the regional stabilisation strategy being developed by the African Union and Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC). They stressed the importance of a community-based approach to ensuring sustainable solutions to the Boko Haram crisis, and highlighted the particularly important roles that traditional rulers, religious leaders, women and youth can and must play in the stabilisation process. In building off the momentum generated by the inaugural meeting the Forum recognized the importance of continuing the process through the following key steps:

* Continue regularly convening the Forum, with the next meeting holding in Niger by the end of the first quarter of 2019 (funded from Phase II);
* The Governors will continue to use the Forum as a platform to foster regional cooperation on stabilisation, peacebuilding and sustainable development[[11]](#footnote-12);
* In addition to the Governor’s Forum Secretariat and the UNDP Regional Stabilization Advisory Team based in N’Djamena, dedicated teams, led by LCBC and UNDP at the country level, will be set up to support the Forum. The project will support the deployment of an Advisor and coordinator, located in N’Djamena[[12]](#footnote-13); and
* The Forum feeds into and supports the Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin[[13]](#footnote-14).

**Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin.** At the request of the African Union Commission (AUC), Phase I provided technical support to drafting the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin. In particular and following various consultations and reviews, Phase I supported the finalisation and validation process of the strategy, including the inter-Ministerial Conference of LCBC Member States on 30 August 2018, where the strategy was adopted. The UNDP Regional Service Centre for Africa, the UNDP Country Office and Resident Coordinator’s Office in Nigeria provided technical support to draft the strategy for review by the LCBC and the AU. The drafting task force and national experts of the four countries met for their final inputs at the Technical Validation meeting held on 27-28 August in Abuja. Following expert validation, the Strategy was adopted by the LCBC Council of Ministers at an inter-Ministerial Conference of representatives of the four Boko Haram-affected Lake Chad countries on 30 August in Abuja. The lead role of the LCBC and Governors´ Forum in coordinating the implementation of the strategy and ensuring State-based stabilisation planning, (i) provides a solid basis to step up cross-border dialogue activities in Phase II, (ii) promotes that synergies across the sub-region are leveraged, and (iii) ensures that cross-border and transboundary solutions to the crisis are better explored. The convening of the Forum will also play a key role to bringing different local government efforts closer together in ensuring effective solutions for borderland areas.

**Support to Local, State and National Strategies, Plans and Policies.** Among the Phase I support activities of the UNDP Country Offices are:

* The UNDP Country Office in Chad engaged with the authorities of the region of Lac, including the Governor, decentralized authorities and community leaders, in developing the region’s comprehensive development plan. Specific areas of support were community development planning; peacebuilding and community security; and data collection. The plan is expected to identify strategic areas that will guide the gradual shift from humanitarian to long-term development. Designed to be wide-ranging, the plan will inform the stabilisation and community security priority areas and activities.
* UNDP Nigeria has supported the Borno State Government in drafting a Community-based Reconciliation and Reintegration Strategy. The process kicked-off with the Borno State Consultative Workshop on Dialogue, Reconciliation and Reintegration held on 16-18 June to provide a dialogue platform for key stakeholders to interchange views, opinions and proposals on the specific issues on reconciliation and reintegration policy and process in Borno State. The draft policy is in the final review stages.
* The UNDP Country Office in Niger, under the guidance of the Department of Religious and Customary Affaires in the Ministry of Interior, supported efforts towards a national de-radicalisation strategy. In addition, the Country Office has been a key partner for the Diffa Regional Council to develop a national stabilisation strategy by implementing the following activities:
* Organize group discussions with representatives of Diffa civil society, local and regional government representatives and state officials to develop Stabilisation Plans for each of the 4 Comunes and the Stabilisation Road Map for the Diffa Region;
* Organize a validation session of the communal Stabilisation Plans and the National Stabilisation Roadmap;
* Organize vulgarisation sessions of the roadmap for stabilisation;
* Update the 4 Communal Development Plans;
* Develop 8 training modules on de-radicalisation and 2 training manuals;
* Organize a training of trainers and 50 religious leaders on de-radicalisation; and
* Build a police station in Bosso.
* UNDP Cameroon organised two workshops, in Kousseri and Mora, where a total of 104 (40 in Kousseri and 64 in Mora; 31 women and 73 men) administrators, traditional leaders, the youth, religious leaders, local elected officials, and civil society actors identified the priority stabilisation needs in 5 target communities. Based on the identified needs, 40 action plans for stabilisation were developed and validated in a participatory and consultative manner. The process to develop stabilisation plans was important in bringing out many pre-Boko Haram, lingering, conflicts that were exacerbated by the crisis and that needed to be tackled by the plans.
* UNDP Cameroon also assessed the legal basis and reintegration needs of former Boko Haram associates. Cameroonian laws and regulations[[14]](#footnote-15) were 1) compared with international reintegration standards and 2) analysed in terms of the possibility to convert members of the vigilance committees. Based on this in-depth analysis of the legal framework, a proposal was made for the development of a common legal framework and an approach guiding the rehabilitation, de-radicalization and reintegration of former Boko Haram as well as the conversion of members of the vigilante committees.
* The approach used in Phase I, while not without challenges, has enabled both the active involvement of authorities at the central level (ministries of the interior, justice, decentralisation) and an appropriation by the local authorities (governor, regional council president, mayors of municipalities and deconcentrated technical services) leading to improved coordination between the two levels in the four countries.

**Awareness raising and training on the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism.** In Cameroon, a working group composed of religious leaders, university teachers specialized in Islamic sciences, traditional authorities, ex-hostages and journalists reviewed Boko Haram’s messages spread in the three most affected three divisions (Mayo-Tsanaga, Mayo-Sava and Logone-et-Chari) of the Far North Region and crafted an alternative narrative, focusing on peace messaging. UNDP Niger, with the support of local NGO VND/Nur sensitized four communities on the process of de-radicalisation and peaceful coexistence through a proven methodology. Consultations on de-radicalisation and the prevention of violent extremism were organised with Village Assemblies with 1,505 participants (747 men and 758 women of which 229 are refugees; 152 returnees; 760 internally displaced persons and 364 host community members). In addition, dialogue fora and focus-groups with neighbouring areas were organised with 13,197 participants (7,135 women and 6,062 men). In Phase II, the project team will train and raise awareness of koranic schools on conflict prevention, deradicalization and the prevention of violent extremism (PVE). Throughout the training, Koranic school teachers, students and community religious leaders will be involved in developing C/PVE messages that will be used to raise awareness through diversified communication and education channels, including, community radios, mosques and school campuses.

**Communication**. To mobilize communities and stakeholders towards stabilisation of the conflict-affected regions, radio broadcasting serves as a major means of socialisation and mobilisation, considering the wide air coverage in the region, accessibility by the population at large and the popularity among the masses. Drama and music have always been popular means of socialisation in the region and have the capacity for mass mobilisation. Some examples:

* UNDP Nigeria partnered with the Population Media Centre (PMC), an NGO with vast experience in behavioural change communication, to design, produce and facilitate the broadcasting of a 26-episode radio drama to address emergent issues in the Lake Chad Basin. The drama has directly reached over 2 million persons (Hausa and Kanuri speakers) among whom are 1 million internally displaced persons and refugees in the Lake Chad region, covering Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. To ensure effective coverage, the following media houses were identified and contracted for the broadcasts:
* Gotel FM- Adamawa State;
* Peace FM- Borno State;
* Yobe Broadcasting- Yobe State; and
* Radio Dandal Kura- border regions of Cameroon, Chad and Niger.
* UNDP Niger has been engaging with 3 community radios (commune of N'Guigmi, Kabléwa and Bosso) to broadcast programmes on de-radicalisation.
* In Cameroon, a series of counter narrative messages were developed and adopted at a workshop, held in the council of Mokolo in June. As a result of this workshop, a team of 5 experts was set-up, covering 5 groups of filmmakers/artists/students; teachers/researchers; NGOs / UN agencies / associations; religious leaders; and the media. The experts committed to convey alternative messages on Boko Haram in the target councils of the project.

**Vigilante / CJTF training, formalisation and reintegration.** In Nigeria, 3000 vigilantes and CJTF received a two-week training to improve their skills; provide improved community security services; and enhance their leadership capacity for conflict resolution, peaceful co-existence, protection of human rights, and prevention of sexual and gender-based violence. The components of the capacity building training consisted of a blend of practical and physical fitness, and lecture series. In Cameroon, a reflection workshop in five councils on vigilante committees, produced an action plan for the transformation of vigilante committees into a municipal police force. The review of the functioning of the vigilante committees reveals the need for technical support and the provision of equipment, as endorsed the authorities of each council. The gendarmerie, police and military were instrumental in supporting the councils in terms of training and supervision of the vigilante committees.

**Reintegration of Boko Haram associates.** In Cameroon, a survey in eight councils identified 584 (435 female and 149 male) former Boko Haram associates. All former associates who returned to their communities mentioned that their current living conditions are better than those with Boko Haram. More than 80% of them were well received by their families and neighbours and while few of them have already received assistance from public services, churches or NGOs in host communities, the majority has not. Most require reintegration support, such as the issuance of official documents (birth certificates and national identity cards); health and psychosocial care; and support for socio-economic integration. An important lesson learned and input for Phase II is that the reintegration of Boko Haram associates in the four countries needs to take place based on harmonised national processes, in line with the regional SPRR framework. LCBC has an important role to play in this process and will require support to deliver on this role.

**In** **summary**, good progress has been made during Phase I, which at the time of writing has been operational for 12 months. While some Phase I activities have concluded, most of these - in line with the original planning - are ongoing and can only be completed during Phase II implementation. It will be critical to maintain these activities so as not to lose initial investments, deliver on community-level expectations and secure intended results.

Phase II was originally planned for 18 months, with a budget of Euro 14 million. Building on phase 1, this amount had been determined as minimum amount required to satisfactorily meet the objectives of Phases I and II. It is important to note that the four Governments and beneficiary communities have the expectation for the project to continue for at least another year. In discussion with authorities, Phase II has been revised to focus on the most critical activities to be implemented in 2019 and early 2020, and the overall budget reduced accordingly to roughly Euro 6.1 million.

1. Building on Achievements of Phase I: Resulting Phase II strategy

As described in the previous section, the support provided in Phase I played an instrumental role in the finalisation and adaptation of the AU/LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy. Informed by an up-stream policy formulation process and bottom-up consultative dialogues, the Strategy now provides a comprehensive, integrated and multi-level framework for overall stabilisation. It comprises nine inter-related pillars, which include military support to the MNJTF, provision of humanitarian assistance, and key interventions to secure early recovery and longer-term resilience. After the success of the Lake Chad Basin Governor’s Forum in May 2018, regional technical and inter-ministerial meetings were successfully organized in late August 2018, and the AU/LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy was duly adopted by the respective authorities and presented in Berlin/Oslo II Conference held in early September 2018.

The Strategy foresees an important role[[15]](#footnote-16) for the Governors of the States surrounding Lake Chad. Phase II will support the Governors (and their Forum) to deliver on this responsibility:

“The Lake Chad Basin Governors Forum for Regional Cooperation on Stabilisation, Peacebuilding and Sustainable Development will serve as the primary mechanism for cross-border cooperation as well as domesticating implementation of this Strategy. The expressed wish of the Governors to play a central role in the stabilisation efforts of Lake Chad, as expressed during the inaugural meeting on the 8th and 9th of May 2018, in Maiduguri, lends the implementation of the strategy the necessary political will and buy-in for effective implementation. The Lake Chad Basin Governors Forum will serve as the mechanism for cross-border dialogue, coordination and exchange on issues relating to areas under this Strategy. This will ensure that synergies across the sub-region are leveraged, and that cross-border and transboundary solutions to the crisis are effectively explored. The convening of the Forum can also help to bring different local government efforts closer together in ensuring effective solutions for borderland areas. In recognizing the unique position and interest of the governors of the sub-region to facilitate and help lead the stabilisation efforts, the governors of the states/regions around Lake Chad will become the principal custodians of the Strategy’s implementation […] Given this role, the Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum also becomes an important platform for sharing information, knowledge, and progress on implementation of the Strategy to promote context-specific best practices for stabilisation in the sub-region.”

Phase II of this programme will be guided by the Regional Strategy and activities have been defined with the upcoming Regional Stabilisation Facility in mind. Phase II continues to prioritise (i) activities in **border** communities and (ii) key regional processes aimed at enhanced political integration and cooperation between the four countries with the aim to address the risk of further destabilisation and radicalisation in a sustainable manner.

Community-based activities under Phase II are complementary to those under the proposed regional Stabilisation Facility, which will focus on **all** affected communities by the Boko Haram crisis (with the exception of those targeted in this project) and therefore covers a much wider territory.

Good practice of Phase I and II will be integrated in the design and scaled-up during the implementation phase of the Stabilisation Facility.

The Boko Haram insurgency and the current humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad Basin have affected regions and communities across borders. While humanitarian assistance will continuously be required to address immediate needs and tackle the looming food crisis, Phase II continues the border community-focused stabilisation approach to start addressing grievances and contribute to ending the spiral of insecurity, forced displacement and conflict. As part of the programme, dedicated support and protection of vulnerable groups is also provided.

Figure 1: Overall Approach to Stabilisation



To lay the foundations for longer-term peacebuilding, recovery and development activities, the programme in Phase II will continue to implement immediate stabilisation measures initiated in Phase I in the selected border communities aiming at: improving community security, rebuilding local administrative and governance structures and strengthen their ability to deliver, and supporting the process of reconciliation and reintegration with former associates of Boko Haram and CJTF members and vigilantes.

During implementation, the regional and country teams will ensure that targeted communities will, simultaneously, receive support in all the areas outlined in the Figure 1.

The areas selected during Phase I have achieved a sufficient level of security to enable local government officials to (re)assume their functions, and activities can start or continue with the aim to rebuild the trust and the social contract between local authorities and the population.

The programme is based on the following Theory of Change:

***If, in target communities,***

* local government officials and traditional and religious leaders set up *inclusive* dialogue platforms, mediate to solve conflicts and work on reconciliation;
* local governments are delivering essential basic services (education, health, water, also supported by other UNDP and agency programmes);
* local stakeholders are involved in designing alternative, non-violent narratives that are accepted by youth and other groups with conflict-carrying capacities;
* legitimate security providers (military, police, community police, CJTF, and vigilantes) improve their interaction and coordination as well as the interaction with the local population;
* CJTF and vigilantes who chose to reintegrate are supported in their reintegration process;
* communities are well-informed and prepared prior to initiating the community-based reintegration process of former Boko Haram associates;
* local social and productive infrastructure is rehabilitated or reconstructed (by other UNDP and agency projects);
* activities are coordinated and, there where possible, harmonised between border communities in the four countries and lessons learned form the basis for improved cross-border programming;

***Then,***

* trust will increase between the local government, the security forces and the population;
* recidivism and recruitment by Boko Haram will diminish;
* social cohesion in the communities will increase;

🡺 And the foundation for a more stable Lake Chad will have been laid in target communities, with positive spill-overs to other communities within the Lake Chad Basin.

Programme objectives

Like the previous, the second phase is developed in close collaboration with the national governments, local authorities and international development partners of the Lake Chad Basin and will align with the regional strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience. Moving away from geographically and thematically fragmented interventions, the overarching goal of the project is to contribute to stabilising the Lake Chad Basin, starting with heavily affected border communities, and establishing the foundations for recovery, peacebuilding and development.

**Objective 1**: **Coordination and implementation of the Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience** of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin strengthened.

**Objective 2:** **Community security, local governance, community-based reconciliation and reintegration** in targeted border communities are strengthened, contributing to enhanced regional stability.

Objective 1 aims to develop regional capacity to implement the Regional Strategy. Among the supported Strategic Objectives of the Regional Strategy are:

* *1: Enhancing Political Cooperation - To improve cooperation, coherence and complementarity among the LCB member states;*
* *2: Strengthening National Capacities - To support National Governments to develop harmonised national coordination mechanism and systems, including the governors’ forum and the regional inter-parliamentary committee for an effective implementation of the strategy in the Lake Chad region; and*
* *4: Capacity of LCBC and AUC is Enhanced - To effectively enhance the capacities of the LCBC Secretariat and the AUC for the effective implementation of the strategy*

Objective 2 contributes to the implementation of the following Strategic Objectives:

* *6: Reinforcement of Community Security and Restoration of Rule of Law - To enhance capacities for safety and security at the community level through increased responsive law enforcement that extends and safeguards the rule of law to all areas, as military forces clear the territory under Boko Haram control;*
* *7: Management of Vigilantes - Disarmament and demobilisation of vigilante groups is managed through appropriate national initiatives for their peaceful re-orientation and reintegration.*
* *8: Promoting Human Rights - To ensure that security service providers operate at the highest levels of integrity and respect for human rights based on international and continental norms and standards;*
* *11: Rehabilitation and Reconciliation - To ensure that persons associated with Boko Haram and other violent extremist groups are rehabilitated according to a common regional approach linked to later reintegration activities and including psychosocial support, health, nutrition (in a first phase) and vocational training and income-generating activities (in a second phase)[[16]](#footnote-17);*
* *12: Reinsertion and Reintegration - To ensure that persons associated with Boko Haram, members of vigilante groups/vigilance committees, returnees (including former prisoners), youth at risk and victims of Boko Haram receive community-based reintegration support, following a harmonized regional approach;*
* *16: Psychosocial Support and Social Cohesion - To provide affected populations access to quality psychosocial counselling services, and to actively participate in community cohesion and trust building interventions;*
* *20: Enhancing Public Participation and Civic Engagement - To strengthen civic engagement and participation in the implementation of the strategy;*
* *21: Improving Cross-Border Cooperation - To strengthen cross-border and transboundary cooperation for mutually beneficial solutions and sub-regional integration;*
* *33: PVE Education, Knowledge and Capacities - To build up indigenous capacity in order to increase knowledge about the phenomenon and the drivers of violent extremism;*
* *34: Mobilising Communities and Counter-Narratives - To empower local communities as actors to prevent, anticipate, and counter radical narratives;*
* *35: Promoting Cross-Border Cooperation for P/CVE - To enhance and empower local, regional and international cooperation based on synergy, appropriation and coordination at all levels;*
* *36: Supporting Peace Architecture - To build, review and strengthen local and national peace architecture, including early warning and early response mechanisms*
* *37: Protecting Women and Girls - To ensure effective protection measures that empower women and girls as beneficiaries and can effectively engage in the stabilisation and peacebuilding process as well as prevention and response to violence extremism. Protect women and girls from all forms of violence, exploitation and abuse.*
* *38: Promoting Women Participation, Empowerment and Socio-Economic Rights - Through UN, AUC and RECs frameworks for Women’s Empowerment domesticated and operationalised in national plans and Territorial Action Plans for the full and effective inclusion and participation of women and girls in the stabilisation, recovery and resilience process, with provision for financial resources as well as coordination framework for the implementation of the National and Territorial Action Plan; and*
* *39: Youth Empowerment, Participation, and Protection - To ensure effective mechanisms are established to ensure that youth are protected, empowered and effectively engaged in structured dialogues, stabilisation and peacebuilding process.*

Country-specific implementation

Towards the end of 2018 and early in 2019 (the process repeats itself in late 2019 and early 2020), UNDP country offices ensure *integrated* annual work planning takes place to establish synergies between and complement activities with the numerous projects and programmes implemented in parallel with this Phase II[[17]](#footnote-18).

The approach necessarily includes the flexibility to respond and adjust to changes in country dynamics, while creating synergies between its areas of intervention. Programme activities will be designed and tailored to the situation in each country based on the conflict analyses, prioritizing interventions based on the specific country needs while ensuring an overall coherent and coordinated approach. The regional coordination team will convene the country specific focal persons to ensure the Annual Work Plan is harmonised and where possible synergies are created, for example in cross-border activities and in counter and alternative narrative development, training and communication.

Overall, in line with the above analysis and identified country-specific needs, the programme resources will be distributed between the four countries based on the following overall formula: Nigeria – 40%; Cameroon, Niger and Chad – 20%. Accordingly, and similar to phase 1, 8 communities will be targeted in Nigeria, 4 communities in Cameroon, 4 in Niger, and 4 communities in Chad.[[18]](#footnote-19)

Immediate priorities in Nigeria will include community security measures (including vigilante profiling, CJTF training, advanced training for the vigilantes targeted in Phase I, SGBV training for security forces); basic capacity development of local governance authorities charged with basic service delivery; and the establishment of peace committees (or strengthening existing committees that can fulfil the role). While physical reconstruction of community infrastructure is not included in the present project, linkages will be established with the existing UNDP early recovery and access to justice projects, the upcoming Stabilisation Facility, the GIZ resilience project and British Council activities in community security to create synergies and maximum impact, among others. In addition, to support the ongoing demobilisation and de-radicalisation process of the Operation Safe Corridor, community-based reconciliation processes will be provided, closely coordinated with IOM´s existing work on demobilisation and rehabilitation.

Immediate priorities in Cameroon will be comparable. However, the emphasis is less on the full reestablishment of security and local governance structures, but on strengthening and capacity building of both, as well as the establishment of peace and grievances committees and the protection of vulnerable target groups, in addition to the provision of immediate employment opportunities. Messages against violent extremism in Cameroon as well as awareness raising against religious radicalism should especially target prisons, which have been identified as one key location for radicalisation.[[19]](#footnote-20) Moreover, UNDP will support the initiative of the government, especially the Ministry of Territorial Administration (MINAT), to organise an inter-ministerial group for stabilisation in the Far North region.

In Niger, capacity development of peace and security committees as well as security providers is ongoing with a focus on the protection of vulnerable groups (defined as women, youth, IDPs, refugees and ex-combatants. In addition, initial demobilisation and reintegration experiments are ongoing, and the programme, in collaboration with relevant partners, provides technical assistance to consolidate the experiments.

98. In Chad, local governance structures are by-and-large in place albeit not sufficiently capacitated. The establishment of peace and grievances committees will be accompanied with participatory local governance planning sessions and capacity building of local administrations. At the same time, access to and linkages to the formal justice chain will be assessed and immediate improvement opportunities for protection of vulnerable people explored. In terms of Screening Prosecution Rehabilitation Reintegration (SPRR) / DDR, the national discussions are less advanced in Chad, and frameworks could not be developed in view of related political sensitivities. A clear process and criteria for SPRR/DRR is yet to be designed and tested on a pilot basis, including systematic screening. Accordingly, under Phase II, UNDP will engage LCBC to initiate discussions and create momentum in close collaboration with above mentioned relevant partners.

The four UNDP country offices will develop detailed annual work plans, in alignment with the overall programme strategy.

Related measures and projects of other governmental or non-governmental organisations

103. Phase II will be guided by Security Council Resolutions and all UN norms and standards. Disengagement of those associated with violent extremist groups does not fall under the rubric of classical Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), given the absence of a peace agreement or cease fire as well as lack of voluntariness to join the process[[20]](#footnote-21). A harmonised, regional approach is vital to avoid cross-border “amnesty arbitrage”, and as a basis for cross-border cooperation on the issue. The programme will continue to work with UN CTED, UNODC and IOM to ensure that policy and practice in regard to handling and treatment of those associated with violent extremist groups conforms to key UN principles of transparency and standards for human-rights compliance and is harmonised between the four countries as fully as possible as per the vision of the LCBC-AU Regional Stabilisation Strategy. UNDP and IOM both engage in “downstream” reintegration and reconciliation initiatives and will work closely to divide responsibility for activities either substantively or geographically in each country, to ensure coordination and avoid duplication of effort.

As mentioned earlier, the programme will be aligned to the Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin, and other relevant international frameworks and strategies, including relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, the UN strategy for the Sahel, and the EU road map for the Lake Chad Basin.

It will closely collaborate with concerned regional organisations, especially AU, LCBC, MNJTF, ECOWAS and ECCAS, fostering regional cooperation and establishing effective channels of coordination exchanges and collaboration between these and the members of the Oslo Consultative Group.

It will be guided by national stabilisation frameworks and implemented in close collaboration and partnerships with the federal and state level governments in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger, which are critical for the successful and sustainable implementation of the programme. Strong partnership with federal authorities and state governments will ensure sustainability in terms of operation and management of the restored basic services. In addition, collaboration with local government administrations and traditional structures will be essential to ensure effective and efficient service delivery. The project implementation will build on the existing network of UNDP partners in the four countries. In addition, close coordination will be undertaken with specialised institutions to enhance the impact of the programme.

In terms of specific measures and projects implemented by other organisations, the programme will establish linkages to, and attempt to create synergies with the partners and projects and initiatives highlighted in the below table.

Table 3: Overview of Related Initiatives and Programmes

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Nigeria | Cameroon | Chad | Niger |
| * International Humanitarian Response (through Intersector working group) * GIZ Borno resilience project, National Police Project and Border project * British Council Access to Justice and Security Project * Worldbank MCRP project * UNICEF Child Soldier protection initiative * IOM DDR pilot project * IOM DDRR regional project (all four countries) * UNODC Access to Justice project | * UNDP/UNICEF prevention of violent extremism and peacebuilding in Cameroon and Chad (under development) * UNDP community empowerment and peace building in the Far North region * UNCT Resilience joint programme in Logone et Chari division * GIZ Police Programme and Socio-economic resilience of vulnerable youth in North * UNCT resilience project in the East Region to address central African refugee crisis * UNFPA / UNDP / UNICEF Stabilisation Project (Under development) | * USAID funded counter-violent extremism in Chad (under development) * UNDP / UNICEF Prevention of Violent Extremism and Peacebuilding in Cameroon and Chad. * WFP / FAO Livelihoods and Resilience Project in the Lake Region * Ongoing MNTJ operations, especially with the civil component * GIZ Police Programme | * National Reintegration Program for the fighters of Boko Haram. * WB Community Action Project * UNODC security cooperation / de-radicalisation projects * GIZ Border & Police Programmes |

Linkages to ongoing and past UNDP projects in the Region

The “Integrated Regional Stabilisation of the Lake Chad Basin – Phase II” programme will be implemented in close alignment with, and technically supported as required by UNDP Africa´s regional programme for the prevention of violent extremism (PVE). This programme is overseen by UNDP’s Regional Service Centre in Addis Ababa and is currently deploying a Senior Advisor dedicated to the Lake Chad Basin. This Advisor will support the implementation of the present programme and ensure that regional programme activities will be linked to and complement the activities of the present programme.

In addition, the programme will work in close conjunction with, and build on existing local UNDP initiatives. In Nigeria, these include the Integrated Community Stabilisation and Resilience project (funded by the EU and Japan), as well as a project (in its final stages) to support peace building and de-radicalisation in Northeast Nigeria (funded by Japan). In Chad, the present programme will establish linkages to the ongoing early recovery, human security and border management projects (funded by UNDP and Japan). In Niger, effective linkages will be created with existing projects supporting 1) the resilience of communities and households, particularly women headed households, along Lake Chad, 2) a Peacebuilding Fund focusing on the socio-economic reintegration of former Boko Haram victims and associates in the Diffa region, and 3) a small project strengthening regional and community peace and security early warning mechanisms. In Cameroon, linkages will be created with the ongoing Stabilisation and Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE, funded by Japan) and PVE and peace-building project (funded by PBSO). For more details on the projects in the 4 countries, please refer to section 1 earlier in this document.

The UNDP Nigeria office is also managing an EU-funded regional pilot small arms and light weapons programme. The project is an integral component of the programme "European Union Support to the ECOWAS Peace, Security and Stability mandate (EU-ECOWAS PSS)", implemented 2013-2019, which seeks to support ECOWAS in its capacity to effectively address factors of instability and reinforce a proactive approach to peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution in West Africa. It seeks to advance implementation of the component "Practical Disarmament" of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) in Member-States. The project, active in the two Lake Chad Basin countries Nigeria and Niger, supports National Commissions of Small Arms (NATCOMS) of the pilot countries and selected communities under the programme. The present stabilisation project will draw on the expertise and work closely with the SALW technical support to disarmament through designated national agencies in the four countries.

**3. Project planning**

1. **Impact**

The present programme will contribute to stabilising targeted border communities in the Lake Chad Basin and establishing the foundations for recovery and development in the geographic region. Guided by a common, regional approach to prevention and stabilisation and supported by cross-border collaboration, the programme will launch a set of interrelated interventions that aim at improving community security, strengthen local governance, promote reconciliation, and support the reintegration of former fighters and CJTF / Vigilantes; thereby preparing communities for recovery.

As such, the programme supports the vision of the German Federal Foreign Office to address conflicts that pose a particular threat to German and European security – in the arc of crisis extending from North Africa to the Middle East, and to support mediation and reconciliation between parties in conflict, the establishment of the rule of law and institutions to protect human rights, and to provide training and developing a democratically-controlled security sector.

The programme is also aligned with the emerging vision of the Oslo Consultative Group on Prevention and Stabilisation in the Lake Chad Region, which recognizes that there is an urgent need for the international community together with the Governments and local organisations in the affected areas to complement humanitarian assistance with a scale up of conflict management and crisis prevention as well as stabilisation activities that set the foundations of a sustainable peace in the region. The programme will enhance regional cooperation, foster local and intra-regional political dialogue and increase the legitimacy of state institutions in conflict-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin.

1. **Outcome/Outputs**

In order to contribute to the above described impact, the programme aims to achieve two specific objectives (outcomes) through a number of interrelated outputs. These include (for details, please refer to the log frame below):

**Objective 1**: **Coordination and implementation of the Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience** of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin strengthened.

* Output 1.1 Coordination and implementation support for the Regional Strategy provided.
* Output 1.2 Regional Governors’ Forum and Secretariat are functional and supporting Lake Chad Basin-wide stabilisation efforts.

**Objective 2:** **Community security, local governance, community-based reconciliation and reintegration** in targeted border communities are strengthened, contributing to enhanced regional stability.

* Output 2.1: Cross-border community security enhanced;
* Output 2.2: Community-based reconciliation and reintegration processes supported.
* Output 2.3: Formal and informal local governance mechanisms strengthened.

1. **Project Targeting**

*Beneficiaries*

In Phase II, the project will continue to support conflict-affected populations in the Lake Chad Basin with a focus on the five groups defined in Phase I:

* Youth with conflict-carrying capacities;
* Conflict-affected women and young girls, especially female breadwinners;
* Vulnerable community members (elderly, people with disabilities, marginalized social groups);
* Surrendering fighters and former vigilantes; and
* Youth and women associated with Boko Haram.

As part of the continuing community-level rapid needs assessment, these groups will be identified and mapped. Gender empowerment is a critical element of the proposed programme. Previous programme implementation experience in the Lake Chad Basin has shown that the systematic inclusion of women in decision making, as well as activities targeting female-headed households, is possible and contributes significantly to the sustainability of interventions.

By the completion of Phase II of the project, processes of regional collaboration, especially as it concerns AU, ECOWAS, ECCAS, LCBC and MNJTF, will be strengthened as measured in the level of alignment of institutional strategies as well as in the increase in information exchanges and consultations.

Over 3,000,000 people in the four countries will have benefitted from the programme through participation in dialogues on de-radicalisation and reconciliation, the effects of cross-border cooperation and exchanges, as well as increased community security.

Figure 1: Overview of Key Activity Results for Phase II

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Programme results | Number |
| Total indirect beneficiaries | 4,500,000 |
| Population reached by reconciliation activities | 3,000,000 |
| Affected communities benefiting from stabilisation | 25 (in four countries) |
| Local Governance Administrations benefiting | 10 (in four countries) |
| Total community beneficiaries directly benefitting from stabilisation activities | 75,000 (52% women) |
| Trained CJTF members / Vigilantes for community security services | 2,000 |
| CJTF members / Vigilantes who have received reintegration support | 1,000 |
| Peace committees or similar coordination mechanisms supported | 10 |
| Supported community-based reconciliation processes | 14 |
| Supported community-based reintegration processes | 5 |

Community-based interventions will have directly supported 75,000 people[[21]](#footnote-22) in 25 most affected target communities in the four countries of the Lake Chad Basin. Twenty-five comprehensive, evidence-based community stabilisation plans and budgets, with a component of community security, have been or will be formulated or updated, and the same number of community participation and monitoring mechanism will be put in place. In addition, 10 percent of community members selected by the communities as part of community dialogue and planning sessions, will receive training and mentoring on de-radicalisation and 20 percent on early detection and prevention of violent extremism.

In addition, 10 local governance administrations and their officials will benefit from capacity building in basic services participatory budgeting, planning and management[[22]](#footnote-23). The project will facilitate population return, contribute to reinstate the key sector ministries’ presence (administrative governance) in ten local governance areas, and support the return of informal governance leaders to their communities. They all will be engaged in development and implementation of community or cluster stabilisation plans. These plans will be linked to the federal level transfers that the local governments receive to ensure sustainability within the participatory planning and budgeting.

*Target communities*

With its second objective, the programme targets the general population of the crisis-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin across the four countries. With regard to community-level interventions, the programme will continue to target 20 communities of the Lake Chad Basin selected during Phase I[[23]](#footnote-24) (Nigeria: 8; Cameroon: 5; Niger: 8; Chad: 4), focussing specifically on the geographic areas detailed in the below table.

Table 4: Geographic Target Areas of the Project

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Nigeria | Niger | Cameroon | Chad |
| Borno, Yobe, Adamawa | Diffa | The Far North | Lac, Kanem, Hadjer-Lamis |

*Mainstreaming of support to the most vulnerable*

Findings from multiple studies and assessments of the crisis reveal that gender equality concerns in the humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad Basin are multi-dimensional and complex. Even prior to the onset of the crisis a combination of structural factors, inter alia, socio-cultural and religious norms were responsible for alarming gender disparities in the northeast of Nigeria. The region has been at the bottom of the ladder with regards to multiple human development indicators such as school enrolment and completion for girls, maternal mortality rates, women economic and political empowerment and incidents of gender-based violence including FGM/C. These weak indicators which have been issues of critical national concern have been further exacerbated by the ongoing humanitarian crisis in the region. The displacement of the local population as a result of the crisis further served to deepen existing gender disparities. The number of female-headed households increased because of the crisis which has claimed an estimated 2 million lives. Lack of access to early warning messages, restriction in mobility due to socio-cultural barriers, dependence on male partners for decision-making and a higher risk of sexual exploitation and abuse are among the specific difficulties encountered by women and young girls in the context. Therefore, inclusiveness in stabilisation programming targeted at women girls and youths will be prioritized in interventions to ensure full including and participation of this group in all programme activities, community-level dialogue and decision making as well as stabilisation planning.

Phase II will continue to prioritize both gender mainstreaming approaches as well as women-specific initiatives to achieve gender equality and women’s empowerment in all programming stages. Project activities will be adjusted during implementation based on the findings of regular sex-disaggregated indicator monitoring (among others based on the planned perception survey in the beginning of Phase II).

Sustained advocacy with traditional cultural institutions as well as mainstream government institutions is expected to result in transformational changes in knowledge and practices towards women’s empowerment within target communities. Technical support provided by UNDP Programme Manager and Gender Advisor will ensure that gender mainstreaming is an integral aspect of all stages of the design, implementation and monitoring of all activities under the project.

1. **Key actors**

The project spans interventions at the political and technical regional level, at the federal and state level as well as interventions at the community level across the Lake Chad Basin. Successful implementation of the project will require the involvement of stakeholders of these three levels. Accordingly, actors (stakeholders) involved in programme implementation will include in the four countries:

* Key officials of relevant regional institutions (ECOWAS, ECCAS, AU, LCBC, MNJTF)
* Designated national and state level focal points for regional cooperation and stabilisation
* Designated national and state level technical focal points for stabilisation and reintegration planning
* Civil society representatives active in the conflict affected areas
* Traditional leaders and selected community representatives
* Representatives of vulnerable groups (especially youth and women)

Close collaboration and partnerships with the federal and state level governments in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger are critical for the successful and sustainable implementation of the programme. Strong partnership with federal authorities and state governments will ensure sustainability in terms of operation and management of the restored basic services. In addition, collaboration with local government administrations and traditional structures and civil society representatives will be essential to ensure effective and efficient implementation of community level activities as well as to design the overarching regional approach. The project implementation will build on the existing network of UNDP partners in the four countries. In addition, close coordination will be undertaken with specialised institutions to enhance the impact of the programme.

1. **Measures and Activities**

All project activities will be coordinated with key stakeholders of the four countries as well as with international partners involved in humanitarian and recovery efforts. In designing its activities, the programme will consult with representatives from target communities, sub-national administrations as well as with representatives of local government administrations of areas affected by the crisis, and with federal authorities.

Objective 1. **Coordination and implementation of the Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience** of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin strengthened.

An important component of the project is to develop LCBC capacity to provide coordination and implementation support for the Regional Strategy. LCBC capacity needs to be strengthened:

* To assist National Governments in developing harmonised national coordination mechanism and systems, including the governors’ forum and the regional inter-parliamentary committee for an effective implementation of the strategy in the Lake Chad region;
* To improve LCBC coordination and support to national government to develop harmonized national policies and approaches for Boko Haram associated persons’ screening, prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration;
* To facilitate cross-border cooperation mechanisms, including a Regional Civil Society Platform and other standing or ad hoc cross-border dialogue initiatives, including regional meetings of youth, women and traditional/religious leaders as appropriate; and

Another area of action is to assist the regional Governors´ in their Lake Chad Basin wide stabilisation efforts. Efforts are ongoing develop a concept for the Governor´s Forum Secretariat. A preliminary proposal, expected to be delivered in December 2018, will be further discussed and validated by LCBC and the Governor´s Forum in 2019 in Niger. The project will support the operationalization of the Governors´ Forum Secretariat to deliver on (i) its coordination role, (ii) territorial action planning and implementation, (iii) ensuring programmatic coherence and (iv) operational support (such as the organisation of one or more Governors´ Fora). Where required, the project will support analytical work relevant for regional stabilisation.

Objective 2. **Community security, local governance, community-based reconciliation and reintegration** in targeted border communities are strengthened, contributing to enhanced regional stability.

To strengthen cross-border community security and based on the initial review of community-level security arrangements including actors, security plans and early warning / response mechanisms (conducted in Phase I), support will be provided for training and deployment of community-based vigilante groups and CJTF members (in coordination with GIZ, UNICEF and UNODC, British Council).

The project will promote the deployment and capacity building of community police, creating linkages and formal relationships between vigilantes and community police, as well as between security forces and communities. Information-sharing mechanisms among the security agencies of the Lake Chad basin and the provision of joint Operational Training Exercises for Police/Gendarmerie and Immigration across the Borders will enhance linkages between community security and formal security and protection forces.

In Phase II, community-based reconciliation and reintegration processes will receive continued support. The development of legal frameworks and policies for reconciliation and reintegration of former Boko Haram associates and awareness raising and dialogue on community-based reconciliation and reintegration are key activities for the first quarter of 2017 and will be closely coordinated with national and international partners active in this field (IOM, UNODC, UNICEF) as well as with UNDP’s regional small arms and light weapons programme. In Niger, UNDP will also provide support with the prosecution of Boko Haram ex-combatants. There where timely, support will be provided for the reintegration of former Boko Haram associates and members, with short-term emergency employment schemes.

For those vigilante groups and CJTF member who wish to reintegrate, the project will provide transferable skills training, and subsequently reintegration support to 10,000 vigilantes into their communities of origin through the provision of support to former vigilantes and to receiving communities.

Regional radio and TV outreach programmes with peace-building and reconciliation messages and counter narratives will accompany and strengthen the activities of community-level committees, and local and cross-border peace initiatives within and between communities, including sport events, cultural exchanges, community peace programmes will be encouraged and supported. Complementing these activities, at the beginning of phase 2, youth lacking opportunities and being at risk of radicalisation will have access to immediate cash for work opportunities, combined with employability support and the opportunity to put their newly acquired skills into practice, in order to ensure an immediate peace dividend.

Lastly, the project will build linkages between community-level initiatives and formal governance structures, aiming at re-establishing confidence and trust of the population in local administrations. Based on the Phase I mapping and profiling of local government structures in target areas, targeted capacity development will continue to be provided to local government officials and community representatives to engage in participatory planning processes, budgeting and monitoring of government services. Members of the various committees will continue to be sensitised on detecting and dealing with radicalised community members. Where required, civil society organisation will receive training on the stabilisation approach.

1. **Timetable** and Activity overview (For details, please refer to the log frame at the end of the document)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Overall objective:** **The Lake Chad Basin is stabilised and foundations for recovery and development established** | | | | | | |
| SO 1: Coordination and implementation of the Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin strengthened. | | | | | | |
| Outputs | Key activities | Quarterly 2018 | | | | 2019 |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 1 |
| Output 1.1 Coordination and implementation **support for the Regional Strategy** provided. | 1.1.1 Strengthen LCBC capacity to support National Governments for an effective implementation of the regional strategy. |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1.1.2 Enhance LCBC coordination capacity and support to national governments to develop harmonized national policies and approaches for SPRR of former Boko Haram associates. |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1.1.3 Enhance LCBC capacity to facilitate cross-border cooperation mechanisms. |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | | |  |
| Output 1.2 **Regional Governors’ Forum and Secretariat are functional** and supporting Lake Chad Basin-wide stabilisation efforts. | 1.2.1 Establish and operationalise a Governors´ Forum Secretariat that provides coordination, strategic, programmatic and operational support and liaises with the LCBC/AU strategy secretariat |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1.2.2 Organise one, or if required more, Governor´s Forum meetings. |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1.2.3 Elaborate analytical documents, as required by the Governors´ Forum. |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | | | |
| SO 2: Community security, local governance, community-based reconciliation and reintegration in targeted border communities are strengthened, contributing to enhanced regional stability. | | | | | | |
| Output 2.1: **Cross-border community security** enhanced. | 2.1.1 Identification, profiling, training and deployment of community-based vigilante groups and CJTF members. |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.1.2 Deployment and capacity development of community police, particularly on SGBV and human rights. |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.1.3 Continuous development and improvement of basin-wide counter and alternative narratives. |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | | |  |
| Output 2.2: **Community-based reconciliation** and reintegration processes supported. | 2.2.1 Technical support to the development of a legal frameworks, policies and technical approach guiding reconciliation and reintegration of former Boko Haram associates. |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.2.2 Training and awareness raising in communities of origin on reconciliation and reintegration. |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.2.3 Pilots for community-level reconciliation processes. |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.2.4 Technical support to registration and profiling of CJFT members and vigilantes. |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.2.5 Provision of transferable skills training and reintegration support to CJTF / vigilantes. |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.2.6 Provision of transferable skills training and reintegration support to former Boko Haram associates. |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.2.7 Facilitate emergency employment (cash-for-work) schemes in the context of the dual targeting approach. |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.2.8 Design and broadcast radio and TV outreach programmes with peacebuilding and reconciliation messaging. |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.2.9 Support peace initiatives and platforms within and between communities (sport, cultural exchanges, among others). |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | | |  |
| Output 2.3: **Formal and informal local governance** mechanisms strengthened. | 2.3.1 Strengthen existing community mobilisation mechanisms (or set up new ones where required), in particular for traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, reconciliation and access to justice (community peace committees). |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.3.2 Conduct stakeholder dialogue on peacebuilding, reconciliation and counter narratives to radicalisation in selected communities. |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.3.3 Capacity development for state and local governments on community engagement and planning, and basic public services monitoring and reporting. |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.3.4 Capacity development of community representatives to engage in participatory planning processes and monitoring of basic public services. |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.3.5 Conduct sensitisation and training for religious leaders and traditional leaders on countering and preventing violent extremism and radicalisation across borders. |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.3.6 Support updating of community stabilisation plans. |  |  |  |  |  |

1. **Indicators**

To reliably measure project progress and success, a number of specific and measurable indicators have been developed for the overall objective, the specific objectives and the project outputs. UNDP, through its project team as well as its country-office based M&E advisor, will regularly monitor progress against these indicators and communicate indicator results to partners and the donor.

To measure progress, a combination of official external and internal data sources will be used. These include humanitarian and development data sets available (Early Recovery indicator tracking, Displacement and Return Tracking), official communications and reports of Ministries and national commissions, UNDP’s annual Livelihoods and Economic Survey as well as its annual Basic Services and Conflict Perception Survey, the international Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project database, as well as regional workshop results report, project monitoring reports and the final project evaluation report.

Key indicators are:

**Overall Objective** – The Lake Chad Basin is stabilised and foundations for recovery and development established:

* % of conflict affected, displaced women, men and children who have sustainably returned / resettled. *Target: 20%.*
* % of vulnerable women, men and children in target areas perceiving significant improvements in terms of safety and access to basic services. *Target: 80%.*

**Specific Objective 1** – **Coordination and implementation of the Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience** of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin strengthened.

* Level of agreement (as measured in % of stakeholders and regional institutions supporting the approach) on the strategy among Lake Chad basin countries and stakeholders. *Target: 80%.*
* Prioritisation regarding to the implementation of the proposed goals and activities of the Regional Strategy among stakeholders has taken place and coordinated strategy implementation commenced (Y/N). Target: Yes.
* % of population (gender disaggregated) in conflict affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin reached by messages and involved in activities of the reconciliation process: *Target: 90%.*

**Specific Objective 2** – **Community security, local governance, community-based reconciliation and reintegration** in targeted border communities are strengthened, contributing to enhanced regional stability.

* Number of vigilantes profiled, trained and deployed with the area-based security scheme. *Target: 60%.*
* % of target communities with functioning and inclusive local committees. *Target 1: 90% functioning committees; Target 2: 40% of members are women.*
* % of population (gender disaggregated) in target communities that feel the dialogue on reconciliation and de-radicalisation and peace initiatives were meaningful and have improved intra- and inter-community tensions. *Target: 80%.*
* Number of target communities with trained community police in place. *Target: 10.*
* Aligned legal frameworks in place in the 4 Basin countries and compliant with key international standards (y/n). *Target: Y.*
* Number of Boko Haram associates participating in reconciliation and reintegration processes. *Target: 2000 (women 1200, men 800).*
* Legal framework for the reintegration of vigilantes / CJTF prepared (y/n). *Target: Y.*

For more details, please refer to the logical framework at the end of this document.

1. **Risks**

The overall risk level of this project is medium to high due to the general volatility of the situation especially as it relates to security and access in conflict-affected areas. Regular assessments and active mitigation will therefore be necessary to manage the various risks in the current environment.

*Key risks and mitigation*

Security risks will be managed through appropriate mitigation measures including negotiations with formal and informal authorities and community leaders to secure a safe environment for implementing partners and community members themselves.

The key political risk to successful implementation of the programme will be insufficient buy-in of key stakeholders in the four countries. This risk will be mitigated through a process of extensive consultations at local, state and national level in the four countries, to ensure that all perspectives are as much as possible aligned. In addition, it is expected that the consultative group will support the generation of political buy-in at national and regional level.

Operational risks include availability of procurement channels, transparency in procurement and recruitments, payment mechanisms, and community engagement modalities that have to be assessed in each locality to identify alternative methods as required, among others. Operational risks will be mitigated by extensive advance planning of procurement and logistics as well as of implementation modalities on the ground. Key processes including the prepositioning of vendors and key recruitments have already been launched during the finalisation of project development and will be completed during the project inception phase. In addition, UNDP can draw in all four countries on established implementation modalities in target areas.

Reputational risks include associations (real or perceived) with parties of the conflict, political actors, rights violators, and need to be managed through wide stakeholder engagement, communication, and coordination with human rights and political arms of the UN system. In addition, regular transparent communication of project activities to all stakeholders as well as regular consultation with counterparts in the four countries will help mitigating this risk.

*Conflict sensitivity*

Widespread disunity and tension in conflict-affected communities in the Lake Chad Basin poses challenges for programmatic interventions. These dynamics risk undermining the outcome and overall attainability of results under this programme if not properly addressed. To ensure that this work considers these dynamics and leverages the connectors in target communities for enhanced peace-building impact, UNDP will update the Conflict Development Analysis (CDA) on grass-roots level done during Phase I, which will serve as a baseline for the tensions and divisions within and across communities.

Programmatically, UNDP will integrate key indicators of divisions and tensions in their regular monitoring activities to ensure that exacerbating tensions and trends can quickly be detected. The integration of key indicators on tensions within the programme’s M&E framework will also ensure feedback into the programme management cycle and allow for a review and modification of activities to address deteriorating dynamics within affected communities.

*Social and Environmental Safeguards*

The programme is also fully compliant with UNDP’s Environmental and Social Safeguards policy. As such, all activities will pass a screening process in terms of possible negative impact, and a grievance reporting mechanism will be established for communities and individual beneficiaries.

Table 5: Overview of Risks and Mitigation Measures

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Risks / externalities** | **Impact** | **Probability** | **Proposed mitigation measures** | **Responsible organisation(s)** |
| Insufficient buy-in of key stakeholders in the four countries. | High | Medium | Political advocacy, and extensive consultations at local, state, national and regional level in the four countries, to ensure that all perspectives are as much as possible aligned. | Consultative group / UNDP |
| Continued Boko Haram attacks | High | High | Work with religious leaders to promote inter- and intra-faith dialogue and inclusivity among community members, as well as to suppress violent narratives. Ensure that community resilience mechanisms such as early warning systems and voluntary community patrols are responsive and in place | UNDP |
| Lack of access due to insecurity | High | Medium | Negotiations with military, formal and informal authorities and community leaders to secure a safe environment for implementing partners and community members themselves. | Local authorities / UNDP |
| Operational bottlenecks (procurement, payments, logistics) | High | Low | Advance planning of procurement and logistics as well as of implementation modalities on the ground (including the prepositioning of vendors and key recruitments). Use of established and tested implementation modalities in target areas. | UNDP |
| Perceived association of project with parties of the conflict, political actors, rights violators | Medium | Medium | Wide stakeholder engagement, communication, and coordination with human rights and political arms of the UN system | Government, local authorities, UNDP |
| Lack of interest of the local stakeholders/communities | High | Medium | Assure that all stakeholders are fully involved at the inception of the project and involve as much as possible key actors at all level to the LPAC | UNDP |
| Political situation/turnover of government | Medium | Medium | Identify key community members who can support and promote community participation/management in activities in the event that local or national government leaders are replaced or that local governments are not able to function due to political transition | UNDP |
| Political blockage at central level | High | High | Set up a continuous platform dialogue between high political, donor, UNDP senior management | UNDP/Donor |

**4. Management, Monitoring, performance review and evaluation**

*Programme steering*

The programme will be overseen and guided by a steering committee composed of designated representatives of the four countries (Government and UNDP) and the German Federal Foreign Office.[[24]](#footnote-25) Regional institutions (AU, ECOWAS, ECCAS, MNJTF, LCBC) will be invited as observers, as and when appropriate.

*Implementation modalities*

UNDP will work with designated national counterparts[[25]](#footnote-26) in the four target countries and involve these in activities planning and implementation.

Technical guidance for implementation of activities in each of the four countries will be provided as required through locally established technical committees comprising key local stakeholders.

The UNDP Regional Service Centre for Africa, in particular its Chad-based Regional Technical Advisory Team, will provide technical oversight, coordination and monitoring services while also leading the regional cooperation in support of the implementation of LCBC’s strategic objectives as indicated in the Pillar one of the Regional Stabilisation Strategy.

Phase II will be implemented by UNDP through the Direct Implementation Modality (DIM). With Steering Committee approval:

* Selected activities can be implemented through a partnership with National and Regional institutions (Governorate, Councils, Technical Department Divisions) and municipalities[[26]](#footnote-27), tailored to the capacities of the relevant institutions within the four countries.
* UNDP will sign a responsible party agreement with a local NGO[[27]](#footnote-28) for activities, such as the organisation of community-level workshops in select communities. This will require the NGO to administer the funds received in full compliance with the detailed work plan agreed upon for the activity and in the most cost-effective way. UNDP will remain responsible for results achievement vis-à-vis the Federal Foreign Office, and closely monitor the implementation of the work plan and the adequate and cost-effective use of funds.
* For the delivery of well-delimited, specific services and the implementation of singular, select activities UNDP may decide during project implementation and in agreement with the project steering committee to procure and contract vendors (private sector entities).

It is important to note that vendors and responsible parties will be selected on a competitive basis and pass a comprehensive due diligence and risk assessment prior to contracting (as per UNDP rules and regulations). As part of the due diligence and risk assessment, UNDP will ensure that:

* Targeted beneficiaries are not known or believed to be current affiliates of Boko Haram, or any other terrorist organisation.
* The materials used by the project will not be transferred to organisations associated with Boko Haram, or any other terrorist organisation.

Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 2253, prospective contractors and vendors will be vetted by UNDP against the Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List as well as against the UNDP suspended vendors and removed vendors list. UNDP’s Programme and Operations Policy and Procedures (<https://popp.undp.org/>), and especially it’s Procurement Ethics, Fraud and Corrupt Practices policy reads as follows:

*“To safeguard UNDP [and the donor], against illicit use of publicly entrusted funds in terrorist financing, business units [country offices] should assess all entities with whom business is conducted to ensure that funds are used for their intended purposes. To sustain financial control of such public funds and compliance with United Nations regulations and guidelines regarding anti-terrorist financing practices, organisational due diligence requires business units to undertake a review of the entity’s profile, including background, financial reports, annual statements, etc., and to confirm business registration with government authorities. All entities should be verified against the UN Security Council’s 1267 Committee list of terrorists and terrorist financiers.”*

In preparation for Phase II, planned activities for 2019 and 2020 will be reviewed by each of the UNDP offices and the 2019 and 2020 annual work plans fine-tuned for project activities at the regional level and in each of the four countriesin close coordination with the German Federal Foreign Office. The programme steering committee will approve the annual work plans. Additional adjustments in light of situation changes can be made as required during the year, based on steering committee approval.

*Project Management*

The programme will be managed by a dedicated coordination team based in the four LCB countries. The team will be overseen by the Chad-based Regional Stabilisation Advisor, and technical support will be provided as required by the UNDP Regional Service Centre.

The coordination team will be supported by dedicated staff in each of the four basin countries and supported by staff of the UNDP country offices in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger in terms of day-to-day operations and coordination with partners.

* *Project coordination team*: One regional stabilization advisor (not funded through the project); one regional stabilisation specialist (P4); a national M&E specialist (NOB); a national procurement officer (NOB, at 50%); a national finance officer (NOB, at 50%); a programme associate and one driver;
* *4 project cells in charge of the implementation and monitoring in the other countries*, located in UNDP project offices in Nigeria (Maiduguri, Borno), Cameroon (Maroua, Far North Region), Tchad (Bol, Lake Chad Region) and Niger (joint UN compound in Diffa). Each country has different staffing requirements, which are reflected in the detailed staffing table in the budget.

The project implementation will build on good practice established during the Phase I of the programme, expertise of existing UNDP projects on stabilisation, conflict prevention and reintegration, and on coordination mechanisms currently in place in the four countries. In addition, the use of existing UNDP capacities on the ground, specifically existing UNDP project and Sub Office structures in the target areas, will allow for important cost efficiencies.

*Monitoring and Evaluation*

The programme approach includes the flexibility to respond and adjust to situation changes and to address the specific needs of each community. Accordingly, budget allocations and beneficiary numbers will change from country to country, and community to community, and will need to be overall adjusted during programme implementation.

Regular monitoring and tracking of results will therefore be required in order to allow for such adjustments of the proposed approach and/or site-specific interventions. The following arrangements will be used for monitoring:

* Progress tracking: data will be collected by UNDP on a quarterly basis to track physical progress as well as initial results (on beneficiaries), against defined indicators. This will be achieved through regular field visits by programme staff and specific monitoring visits by the M&E officers, who will regularly collect data against all indicators defined in the log frame. Documented progress will be discussed in regularly technical committee meetings and recommendation for adjustments made.
* Risk and Scenario monitoring: quarterly monitoring of risks and assumptions, as well as various scenarios will be undertaken to adjust the risk mitigation plan. Management actions will be defined and followed up using a risk log.
* Knowledge management: lessons learned and good practices will be captured regularly to allow for scaling up and replication.

For Phase II, UNDP will submit to the members of the Programme Steering Committee: Quarterly progress updates and a final progress report upon programme closure.

Evaluation of the impact will require regular and sound long-term analysis. To that effect, UNDP will conduct and use a Livelihoods and Economic Survey and a Basic Services and Conflict perception survey on an annual basis (funded separately).

An important lesson learned from Phase I is that stronger and more consistent coordination between nationally operating monitoring experts is required to ensure a coherent approach towards improving results, preparing reports and reporting on success stories and testimonies. For this, the regional team will be boosted with a monitoring expert.

The programme will be subject to an independent evaluation at the end of Phase II. The evaluation will draw on all monitoring and survey data and generate additional qualitative and quantitative data to establish an overall conclusion. The project shall be subject to the internal and external auditing procedures laid down in the UNDP´s Financial Regulations, Rules and directives.

|  |
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| **5. Public relations** |

UNDP will take all appropriate measures to publicise the programme and its achievements as part of the support of Germany to the Lake Chad Basin countries, and the stabilisation of this region. Information given to the press and programme beneficiaries, all related publicity materials, official notices, reports, and publications, as well as all procurement notices shall acknowledge that the programme was carried out with funding from the German government.

**6. Financial plan**

Total funding for **Phase 1 is EURO 6,000,579**. For the implementation of activities of phase 1, EURO 1,924,364 was requested in 2017, and EURO 4,076,215 for 2018. The distribution of allocations between the 4 countries as well as for regional activities in phases 1 and 2 are shown in the following tables. Please note, however, that 2019 allocations will be adjusted based on detailed annual work plans developed and approved by the Steering Committee.

Table 6: Overview of distribution of 2018 funds between countries

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Phase 1 | | | | |
| Reg (Nigeria) | Nigeria | Cameroon | Niger | Chad |
| 590,000 | 1,988,412 | 1,392,789 | 1,116,724 | 911,855 |

Total funding required for Phase II amounts to **Euro 6,264,726.51** million. Phase II will kick-off 1st of January 2019 and end 31st March 2020. Note that the final annual distribution will be defined through detailed annual workplans.

Table 11: Overview of anticipated distribution of 2019 and 2020 funds between countries

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Phase 2 | | | | | |
|  | Regional (Chad) | Nigeria | Cameroon | Niger | Chad |
| 2019 | 437,128 | 1,813,796 | 1,187,771 | 1,156,813 | 961,039 |
| 2020 | 60,324 | 233,699 | 191,362 | 107,763 | 115,032 |

For further details on the funding plan and budget, please refer to the attached excel workbooks on budget planning and an itemised budget.

**7. Other**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Please declare the following:  1. a) Have you enclosed the financial plan? yes  no  b) Is the total expenditure covered? yes  no  c) Do you request a lump sum for a budget item? yes  no    2. Does the amount of public allocations exceed 50% of your organisation’s expenditures?  N.B. Public allocations include all subsidies received directly and indirectly from a German public authority, including the federal, regional and local authorities. This also includes subsidies received from the European Union.  yes  no  3. a) Total of allocation being applied for (Phase II) Euro 6,264,726.51  b) Total own resources and third-party funding N/A  c) Total cost of the project Euro 6,264,726.51  4. This is an application for initial  or follow-up funding  If follow-up funding, are the accounts for the previous allocation settled? yes  no  Reference number if the most recent item of correspondence received from the Federal  Foreign Office:  5. Project start date: 1 January 2019  Project end date: 31 March 2020  Has the project already started? yes  no  If yes, why:  6. Have you enclosed your annual report and statutes? yes  no  If not, why? A separate web link will be provided for all UNDP annual reports.  7. Do you plan to use Federal Foreign Office funds to finance the project next year as well?  Yes  8. Have you investigated any other possible way of financing your project?  yes  no  if not, please specify: This proposal is for the final phase of the project. As discussed, partnership efforts will be focused in collaboration with the Federal Foreign office on the planned Stabilization Facility.  By signing this funding application, the applicant confirms that he or she has exhausted all efforts to find alternative funding sources for this project. As a result, funds of the Federal Foreign Office are being applied for as subsidiary funds.  9. Did you already apply or receive any other public grant for this project?  no  yes  if yes, please specify:  10. What are your overheads for administration?  8%, as per UNDP Executive Board Decision (to which Germany is a member)  11. Are you entitled to deduct value added tax under Section 15 of Germany’s Value Added Tax Act?  yes  no  if yes: By signing this application, the applicant confirms, that he/she is eligible to deduct German Value Added Tax for this/all projects according to Section 15 of Germany’s Value Added Tax Act. The Federal Foreign Office hereby informs the applicant, that only net values may be stated in the financial plan and that only those qualify for funding.  Or are you or your organisation eligible for any other form of tax concession?  yes  no  If yes, please specify.  As per UNDP’s status and based on the SBAA signed with the Governments of the 4 LCB countries, UNDP is exempted from value-added taxes.  12. Will you use the allocation to purchase deliveries, services and/or construction work? yes  no  If yes, please specify.  Services include (as per project work plan): expert (consultancy) services for the provision of technical expertise to national counterparts, office equipment for dedicated project staff, evaluation and audit services, printing and production for visibility, as well as various activity-related goods and equipment.  13. Will you use the allocation to purchase equipment in the course of the project?  yes  no  If yes, how will they be used after the project has ended?  Office equipment will be disposed or transferred in agreement with the donor. Activity-related equipment will be immediately transferred to beneficiaries. | |
| Addis Ababa, 27 November 2018 | |
| Signature 1: | Signature 2: |
| Lamin MANNEHDirector, Regional Service Centre for Africa | Mohamed YahyaHead of Regional Programme |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **LogFrame: Projekt-Nr. /** Projectno**.: \_\_\_**  **PROJEKTTITEL /** Project title**: Integrated Regional Stabilisation of the Lake Chad Basin – Phase II** | | | | | |
| **INTERVENTIONSLOGIK** Intervention logic | | **PROJEKTBESCHREIBUNG**  Project Description | **INDIKATOREN**  Indicators & Target Phase II | **QUELLEN DER NACHPRÜFBARKEIT**  Sources of Verification | **ANNAHMEN UND RISIKEN \***  Assumptions and Risks |
| **INTERVENTIONSEBENE**  Level of intervention | **OBERZIEL**  Overall objective/ Impact | The Lake Chad Basin is stabilised and foundations for recovery and development established | * % of conflict affected, displaced women, men and children who have sustainably returned / resettled. *Target: 20%.* * % of vulnerable women, men and children in target areas perceiving significant improvements in terms of safety and access to basic services. *Target: 80%.* | * Displacement and Return Tracking (DRM) * UNDP Livelihoods and Economic Survey * UNDP Basic Services and Conflict Perception Survey * ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project) database | Bitte nicht ausfüllen/leave empty. |
| **PROJEKTZIEL 1**  Specific objective 1 | 1: Coordination and implementation of the Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin strengthened. | * Level of agreement (as measured in % of stakeholders and regional institutions supporting the approach) on the strategy among Lake Chad basin countries and stakeholders. *Target: 80%.* * Prioritisation regarding to the implementation of the proposed goals and activities of the Regional Strategy among stakeholders has taken place and coordinated strategy implementation commenced (Y/N). *Target: Yes.* | * Regional workshop results report, and stakeholder comments * Project monitoring reports | * Political buy-in and engagement of the 4 countries, as well as civil society stakeholders * Risk: Specific national and civil society actors will undermine the process |
| **Ergebnisse 1.1**  Expected results 1/output 1.1 | 1.1. Coordination and implementation support for the Regional Strategy provided. | * Level of satisfaction of member countries. Target: 100% satisfied or very satisfied. | * Interviews during the evaluation | * Risk: Security situation at local levels in the LCB will prevent the timely implementation of the strategy. |
| **AKTIVITÄTEN/ Maßnahmen 1.1**  Activities/ Tasks 1.1 | * + 1. Strengthen LCBC capacity to support National Governments for an effective implementation of the regional strategy.     2. Enhance LCBC coordination capacity and support to national governments to develop harmonized national policies and approaches for SPRR of former Boko Haram associates.     3. Enhance LCBC capacity to facilitate cross-border cooperation mechanisms | | | |
| **Ergebnisse 1.2**  Expected results 2/output 2 | 1.2. Regional Governors’ Forum and Secretariat are functional and supporting Lake Chad Basin-wide stabilisation efforts. | * % of critical stabilization issues that were considered and constructively addressed by the LCB Governors Forum. Target: 75% of issues. | * LCB Reports * Review during Project Evaluation | * Continuous buy-in of member country governments into the Forum, despite political changes in 2019. |
| **AKTIVITÄTEN/ Maßnahmen 1.2**  Activities/ Tasks 1.2 | 1.2.1 Establish and operationalise a Governors´ Forum Secretariat that provides coordination, strategic, programmatic and operational support, and liaises with the LCBC / AU strategy secretariat. .  1.2.2 Organise one, or if required more, Governor´s Forum meetings.  1.2.3 Provide analytical documents, as required by the Governors´ Forum. | | | |
| **PROJEKTZIEL 2**  Specific objective 2 | 2. Community security, local governance, community-based reconciliation and reintegration in targeted border communities are strengthened, contributing to enhanced regional stability. | * Aligned legal frameworks in place in the 4 Basin countries and compliant with key international standards (y/n). *Target: Y.* * Legal framework for the reintegration of vigilantes / CJTF prepared (y/n). *Target: Y.* | * Project monitoring reports * Final project evaluation | * Local governance and security work will synergise with basic services interventions of other actions, thus supporting stabilisation |
| **Ergebnisse 2**  Expected results 2/output 2.1 | 2.1 Cross-border community security enhanced. | * Number of target communities with trained community police in place. *Target: 10.* * Number of vigilantes profiled, trained and deployed with the area-based security scheme. *Target: 60%.* | * Project monitoring reports * Final project evaluation | * Population and local authorities will engage in the development of local stabilisation & security plans |
| **AKTIVITÄTEN/ Maßnahmen 2.1**  Activities/ Tasks 2.1 | * + 1. Identification, profiling, training and deployment of community-based vigilante groups and CJTF members.     2. Deployment and capacity development of community police, particularly on SGBV and human rights.     3. Continuous development and improvement of basin-wide counter-narratives. | | | |
| **Ergebnisse 2.2**  Expected results 2.2/output 2.2 | 2.2 Community-based reconciliation and reintegration processes supported. | * Number of Boko Haram associates participating in reconciliation and reintegration processes. *Target: 2000 (Women 1200, men 800).* | * Project monitoring reports * Official reports of the Ministries of Interior of the four countries | * A critical mass of vigilantes voluntarily participates in the programme * Local and police authorities buy-in |
| **AKTIVITÄTEN/ Maßnahmen 2.2**  Activities/ Tasks 2.2 | 2.2.1 Technical support to the development of a legal frameworks, policies and technical approach guiding reconciliation and reintegration of former Boko Haram associates.  2.2.2 Training and awareness raising in communities of origin on reconciliation and reintegration.  2.2.3 Pilots for community-level reconciliation processes.  2.2.4 Technical support to registration and profiling of CJFT members and vigilantes.  2.2.5 Provision of transferable skills training and reintegration support to CJTF / vigilantes.  2.2.6 Provision of transferable skills training and reintegration support to former Boko Haram associates.  2.2.7 Facilitate emergency employment (cash-for-work) schemes in the context of the dual targeting approach.  2.2.8 Design and broadcast radio and TV outreach programmes with peacebuilding and reconciliation messaging.  2.2.9 Support peace initiatives and platforms within and between communities (sport, cultural exchanges, among others). | | | |
|  | **Ergebnisse 2.3**  Expected results 2.3/output 2.3 | 2.3 Formal and informal local governance mechanisms strengthened. | * % of target communities with functioning and inclusive local committees. *Target 1: 90% functioning committees; Target 2: 40% of members are women.* * % of population (gender disaggregated) in conflict affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin reached by messages and involved in activities of the reconciliation process: *Target: 90%.* | * Project Monitoring Reports * Final Project Evaluation * UNDP Community Basic Services and Conflict Perception Survey | * Cross-border work of committees will be supported by state and local authorities |
|  | **AKTIVITÄTEN/ Maßnahmen 2.3**  Activities/ Tasks 2.3 | 2.3.1 Strengthen existing community mobilisation mechanisms (or set up new ones where required), in particular for traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, reconciliation and access to justice (community peace committees).  2.3.2 Conduct stakeholder dialogue on peacebuilding, reconciliation and counter narratives to radicalisation in selected communities.  2.3.3 Capacity development for state and local governments on community engagement and planning, and basic public services monitoring and reporting.  2.3.4 Capacity development of community representatives to engage in participatory planning processes and monitoring of basic public services.  2.3.5 Conduct sensitisation and training for religious leaders and traditional leaders on preventing violent extremism and radicalisation across borders.  2.3.6 Support updating of community stabilisation plans. | | | |

*\* Risks and Assumptions are presented in this table as interlinked: political buy-in is assumed; the risk is that there is not sufficient political buy-in, etc.*

1. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, A/65/741, 21 March 201, para. 4. The 22 countries were Afghanistan, Burundi, CAR, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Indonesia, Iraq, Kosovo, Nepal, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Uganda. In Haiti and Somalia the programmatic focus was on community security. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. For more information, please refer to: <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/turkey/docs/operations/IPSAS_CO_Presentation_for_donors.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. More details: <http://web.undp.org/execbrd/pdf/dp08-16Rev1.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. OCHA Lake Chad Basin: Crisis Overview (as of 26 July 2018) [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. Sources for 1,2,3, 12: OCHA Lake Chad Basin: Crisis Overview (as of 26 July 2018);

   Estimates for 4, 5 and 11 based on ICG and Control Risk 2017.

   Source for 6: UN / WB / EU RPBA 2016.

   Source for 7: Revised Requirement and Response Priorities (September 2018).

   Estimates for 8, 9 and 10: From UNDP field colleagues and World Justice Project 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. Please refer to UN SC presidential statement S/PRST/2015/14: „“The Security Council acknowledges the economic burden borne by the Boko Haram-affected countries and welcomes the continuing commitment of Member States and international partners participating in support of the MNJTF in combatting the Boko Haram terrorist group.[...] The Security Council notes the steps being taken by the AUC to provide the support necessary for the full operationalisation of the MNJTF in line with the relevant provisions of the MNJTF CONOPS to fight against Boko Haram.“ [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. High-Level Conference on the Lake Chad Region, Outcome Statement by the Co-hosts. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. International Crisis Group (February 2017), Report No. 244: “Watchmen of Lake Chad: Vigilante Groups Fighting Boko Haram”. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. Institute for Security Studies (June 2017), Working Paper: “AU summit 29: Eradicating more than just Boko Haram”. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. The reports are: 1) 2017 Annual Report on Integrated Regional Stabilisation of the Lake Chad Basin; 2) Progress Report: January - May 2018; and 3) Progress Report: June – September 2018. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. At the time of writing, the process of defining the institutional support to the Governor´s Forum is ongoing. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. The first task of this professional (support by the regional and country office teams) would be to support the planning and preparations for the next Forum meeting in Niger. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. Report of the inaugural meeting of the lake chad basin governors’ forum for regional cooperation on stabilisation, peacebuilding and sustainable development in the region affected by Boko Haram, State Conference Hall, Maiduguri, Borno State, Federal Republic of Nigeria 8–9 May 2018. Organized jointly by the State Government of Borno and the United Nations through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. 1) The Anti-Terror Law and the Code of Military Justice; 2) Law and rules relating to customary courts; 3) Rules on the vigilance committees and the municipal police; and 4) Decentralization rules applicable to municipalities and regulatory framework for assistance to vulnerable people. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. See page 20 of the Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. At the time of writing, in Nigeria, IOM, UNICEF and UNDP are in the process of outlining the division of labour for rehabilitation and reintegration of former Boko Haram associates. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. For example, in Nigeria, Borno State, Phase II will focus on core stabilisation activities, while the EU funded “Borno Package” focuses on complementary activities, such as social and productive infrastructure, vocational training and medium-term livelihoods support. Each country office, during the annual planning exercise, defines complementary and synergetic activities between the different projects and related funding streams. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. The target communities for phase 2 will be the same as during phase 1, with the intention to complete the initiatives which were launched in phase 1. However, location changes may occur during phase 2 in view of the volatile environment. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. Please refer to: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/cameroon-confronting-boko-haram>. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. The work is implemented under the purview of the UNDP Office in Geneva, which co-chairs the Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR. Practices and lessons from recent programme work on the formulation of strategies for the treatment and handling of Boko Haram-associated persons in the Lake Chad Basin have been instrumental in developing global UN guidance on the Reintegration of Persons Associated with Armed Groups Designated as Terrorist Organizations, with applicability in many other parts of Africa and beyond. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. This calculation assumes an average size of one community of 3,750 people and 500 households, with an average size of 8 persons per household. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. Following the assumption that in average, one local government body covers two targeted communities. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. During implementation of Phase I, the following criteria were identified and used for the selection of target communities: (i) accessibility and security, (ii) population size (actual and displaced); (iii) vulnerability and severity, (iv) community of return for former Boko Haram associates and (v) the strategic importance of the main location for stabilisation and cross-border cooperation. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. UNDP will ensure that proposed strategic level decisions, Annual Work Plans and proposed budget allocations are communicated two weeks prior to the Steering Committee meeting to allow the approval process in the German Federal Foreign Ministry to take place and allow time for the incorporation of possible amendments. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. In Cameroon: The Ministry of Economy, Planning and Regional Development (MINEPAT). In Niger: The Ministy of interior and public security and the High authority in charge of peace building (HACP). In Nigeria: The State Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. Through Letters of Agreement (LOAs) or Project Partnership Agreements in accordance with UNDP programme management and procurement procedures and clearly reflected in the Annual Work Plans. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. The use of local NGOs is preferred over private-sector vendors in a stabilisation setting with a view to supporting the emerging civil society. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)